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University of ChicagoIn 1894, the Third Republic and tsarist Russia ﬁnalized a military alliance. In
both countries, politicians and substantial segments of the public participated
in elaborate performances of friendship celebrating this diplomatic milestone,
which became known as the Dual Alliance. Appearing at a naval base to wel-
come a visiting French squadron, Tsar Alexander III shocked onlookers by
standing at attention as an orchestra struck up “La Marseillaise,” that hymn
of revolution hitherto banned in Russia.1 Across France, republican politicians
organized lavish feasts at which they toasted the health of the autocrat and his
empire.2 Hundreds of thousands turned out to witness ofﬁcial exchanges, con-
sumers eagerly acquired books, posters, and food products commemorating the
alliance, and people from all walks of life wrote songs and poems celebrating
the newfound amity between the two countries. One enterprising author even
penned a “Franco-Russian Marseillaise,” which saluted the autocracy as a
steadfast friend of the republic.3
The diplomatic historians who have long enjoyed a monopoly on the story of
the Franco-Russian Alliance do not dwell on these striking attempts to recon-
cile the political cultures of Europe’s ﬁrst republic and its last autocracy. Their
accounts trace how the two powers came to recognize their common interest in
preventing German domination of the continent, and they reconstruct the secret
exchanges between high-ranking military and diplomatic ofﬁcials that ulti-
mately produced an agreement. Focusing exclusively on the raisons d’état that
motivated the rapprochement and the small circle of men who directed it, these
studies suggest that diplomacy was driven by its own logic, protected from* I am grateful to Laura Engelstein, to the JMH ’s three anonymous referees, and to
the participants of seminars at the University of California at Berkeley, Harvard Univer-
sity, the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and Yale University, who offered valuable
feedback on earlier versions of this article.
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1 François Bournand, Russes et français: Souvenirs historiques et anecdotiques (Paris,
1898), 110.
2 PhilippeDeschamps, Le livre d’or de l’Alliance Franco-Russe (Paris, 1898), 106–66.
3 I. S. Rybachenok, Rossiia i Frantsiia: Soiuz interesov i soiuz serdets (Moscow,
2004); Bournand, Russes et français, 134–70. On the “Marseillaise,” ibid., 154–55.
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Athe pressures of domestic politics and public opinion.4 Yet it was not preordained
that the general public would accept this diplomatic fait accompli. For much of
the nineteenth century, French and Russian patriots saw their national traditions
as diametrically opposed to one another; as late as the 1870s and 1880s, many
would have dismissed the prospect of a friendship between the two countries as
impossible.5 Why, then, did so many politicians and citizens enthusiastically
celebrate the alliance in the 1890s? How did a long history of Franco-Russian
conﬂict give way to efforts to write Russia into “La Marseillaise”?
This article argues that the relationships between diplomacy and publicity,
between foreign policy and domestic politics, were more interactive in the case
of the Dual Alliance than previous accounts have suggested. It examines how
a public campaign conducted by private citizens in favor of Franco-Russian
friendship facilitated the rapprochement, and it connects the reconciliation of
the two powers to profound changes in French politics. The idea of an alliance
ﬁrst coalesced in Paris’s salon scene in the 1870s, when Russian defenders of
the autocracy established a dialogue with prominent French republicans. Over
the next several decades, the members of this network tirelessly agitated in pur-
suit of this goal. Using their personal connections, they lobbied high-ranking
politicians who would go on to play key roles in the diplomatic rapprochement.
At the same time, they fostered cultural and political exchanges and used the
mass media to carry out a campaign of public diplomacy. All of these activities
aimed to explain the values of the autocracy in terms that French citizens could
ﬁnd acceptable—and to convince Russian patriots that the Third Republic
could be a valuable ally. This network did not create the strategic interests that
drove the Franco-Russian rapprochement. Nor was it in a position to make pol-
icy, since it operated largely outside of formal government structures. It did,
however, play a crucial role in creating a political climate in which politicians
and citizens of the two countries could begin to see each other as allies rather
than adversaries.
The network that promoted the rapprochement was remarkably diverse, unit-
ing elite aristocrats and self-made men and women, leftists critical of social in-
justice and conservatives terriﬁed by revolutionary disorder. Yet through years4 For example, Pierre Albin, La paix armée: L’Allemagne et la France en Europe
(1885–1894) (Paris, 1913); William L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890–
1894 (Cambridge, 1929); B. E. Nolde, L’Alliance Franco-Russe: Les origines du système
diplomatique d’avant-guerre (Paris, 1936); George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance:
France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (New York, 1984).
5 Michel Cadot, La Russie dans la vie intellectuelle française, 1839–1856 (Paris,
1967); Charlotte Krauss, La Russie et les Russes dans la ﬁction française du XIXe siècle
(1812–1917) (Amsterdam, 2007), 7–286; Dmitry Shlapentokh, The French Revolution
in Russian Intellectual Life (New Brunswick, NJ, 2009), 13–76.
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Aof dialogue, its members managed to bridge their differences. They engaged in
playful exchanges that identiﬁed points of convergence in seemingly divergent
ideological systems. Many also reconciled contradictory ideas and experiences
through the act of conversion, altering their creed, their citizenship, or their
ideological views. Ultimately, the circle harnessed these cultures of transforma-
tion to beneﬁt the cause of Franco-Russian friendship. Its Russian members
came to admire—and even celebrate—the republican ideal of popular sover-
eignty. Its French associates became enamored with Russia’s autocracy and
with the organic bonds that supposedly linked the tsar to his people. By the early
1890s, the network had produced a new ideological hybrid that reframed republi-
can mass politics in a distinctly antiliberal and authoritarian vein, creatively recon-
ciling political platforms drawn from the left and right and models of governance
originating from France and Russia. These exchanges created new entanglements
between the political cultures of the two powers, producing ideological styles and
modes of thought that both French and Russian patriots could embrace. More than
mere rhetoric, the “Franco-Russian Marseillaise” and the other performances of
friendship that celebrated the Dual Alliance were culminations of this sustained
process of convergence.
The curious ideological synthesis produced by the advocates of Franco-
Russian friendship left an indelible mark on French political life. The boosters
of the rapprochement played prominent roles in the antiliberal revolution that
transformed France’s domestic politics at the same moment that the Dual Alli-
ance redirected its foreign policy. They were involved in the Boulangist agita-
tion of the 1880s, which married nationalist and socialist ideas, authoritarian
visions and populist rhetoric.6 They played prominent roles in the Panama
and Dreyfus affairs, which unleashed a ﬂood of antisemitism and xenophobia.7
Historians have identiﬁed a host of internal economic, political, and intellectual
transformations that colluded to undermine parliamentary democracy in late
nineteenth-century France.8 This article identiﬁes another current that ﬂowed
into France’s illiberal tidal wave: a Russian critique of liberal ideas that entered6 For overviews, see William D. Irvine, The Boulanger Affair Reconsidered: Royal-
ism, Boulangism, and the Origins of the Radical Right in France (New York, 1989);
James R. Lehning, To Be a Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third Re-
public (Ithaca, NY, 2001), 155–81.
7 See Jean-Denis Bredin, L’Affaire (Paris, 1983); Ruth Harris, Dreyfus: Politics,
Emotion, and the Scandal of the Century (New York, 2010).
8 For an account that emphasizes economic factors, see Philip G. Nord, Paris Shop-
keepers and the Politics of Resentment (Princeton, NJ, 1986). On intellectual and polit-
ical factors: Zeev Sternhell, La droite révolutionnaire: Les origines françaises du fas-
cism (Paris, 2000); Vicki Caron, “Catholic Political Mobilization and Antisemitic
Violence in Fin de Siècle France: The Case of the Union Nationale,” Journal of Modern
History 81, no. 2 (2009): 294–346.
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AFrench culture via the campaign for the rapprochement. The “Franco-Russian
Marseillaise” celebrated a new era of international exchange and friendship,
but it also marked the emergence of novel challenges to liberal democracy in
France.
France’s Third Republic and Russia’s Old Regime
A mere decade before the Franco-Russian entente was formalized, the prospect
of an alliance between the two countries would have seemed unthinkable to
knowledgeable observers. The two countries had waged war on each other
twice in the nineteenth century, and diplomatic relations remained tense at
the birth of the Third Republic. Having remained neutral during the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870–71, Russia moved even closer to France’s chief rival,
Germany, in its aftermath. In 1873, the autocracy forged a formal alliance with
Germany and Austria—a union of the continent’s conservative dynastic powers
that became known as the Dreikaiserbund.9
The conﬂicting ideological foundations of the Third Republic and the tsarist
regime intensiﬁed the geopolitical conﬂict between the two states. By the late
1870s, a democratic political culture that demanded the active engagement of
the republic’s increasingly literate and politically conscious citizenry had be-
come ﬁrmly entrenched in France.10 Boasting the continent’s broadest suffrage
as well as its most developed mass media, the Third Republic presided over the
birth of what one of its citizens called “the era of the public.”11 The Russian
Empire, by contrast, had neither a constitution nor a parliament nor a free press;
its autocratic ruler was empowered to ﬂout the rule of law on a whim. Remark-
ing on the archaic structures of the tsarist regime, one French observer dis-
missed Russia as a living anachronism that had no place in the “civilized”
world. “Even the [Ottoman] sultan has become, perhaps despite himself, a con-
stitutional sovereign; the emperor of Russia has remained an autocrat.”12
Yet behind the facade of an unchanged autocracy, some Russian patriots had
begun to use ideas and a lexicon inspired by Western mass politics to reinforce
the power of the tsarist state. In the 1860s Mikhail Katkov, the publisher of the
inﬂuential daily Moskovskie vedomosti, developed a program of “state nation-
alism.” Katkov embraced the Western idea of national self-determination but
stripped it of its liberal-democratic agenda. The journalist presented the autoc-9 For an overview of Russian-German relations, see George F. Kennan, The Decline of
Bismarck’s EuropeanOrder: Franco-RussianRelations, 1875–1890 (Princeton,NJ, 1979).
10 Philip G. Nord, The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-
Century France (Cambridge, 1995).
11 On suffrage, ibid., 1; on media, Raymond Kuhn, The Media in France (New York,
1995), 17. The quote is from Gabriel de Tarde, L’opinion et la foule (Paris, 1904), 11.
12 Ernest Lavigne, Introduction à l’histoire du nihilisme russe (Paris, 1880), 19.
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Aracy as the defender of Russia’s Orthodox believers, whom he argued needed
protection from dangerous “internal enemies” lurking within the empire—
namely, Poles and Jews.13 By the 1870s, Katkov’s antiliberal nationalism devel-
oped an international agenda. The journalist became a prominent activist in
Russia’s Pan-Slavic movement, which demanded the “liberation” of the Ortho-
dox believers of the Balkans from the Ottoman and Habsburg empires and their
uniﬁcation under Russian rule.14
Pan-Slavic activists developed a complex relationship with the autocracy. On
the one hand, the movement, which was dominated by aristocrats, provided a
new means of enlisting the Russian elite in the service of the state and a novel re-
sponse to the challenges that nationalism posed to the dynastic empire. As a result,
tsarist ofﬁcials offered moral and ﬁnancial support to the movement at crucial
junctures. On the other hand, Pan-Slavic leaders frequently criticized the foreign
policy of Tsar Alexander II. They vigorously denounced the Dreikaiserbund, in-
sisting that Germany threatened Russian interests in southeastern Europe. And
when Orthodox uprisings began in the Balkans in the mid-1870s, they demanded
that Alexander do more to assist these rebellions against Ottoman rule.15
Paradoxically, the Pan-Slavic activists who hoped to change Russia’s foreign
policy beneﬁted from the autocracy’s reliance on personalized power. When they
encountered resistance from imperial ofﬁcials, they used their wealth and connec-
tions to circumvent formal bureaucratic channels. In the mid-1870s, Pan-Slavic
committees organized an army of almost 5,000 volunteers to join the Balkan up-
risings.16 Meanwhile, activists relentlessly lobbied the tsar’s brothers. In response
to growing pressure, a reluctant Alexander II declared war on the Ottoman Em-
pire in 1877.17 Within a year, Russian military campaigns had won new spheres
of inﬂuence in the Balkans. However, military victory did not satiate the Pan-
Slavs’ appetites. After the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which saw Otto von Bis-
marck strip Russia of some of its territorial gains, activists continued their cru-
sade and intensiﬁed their anti-German agitation.1813 Andreas Renner, Russischer Nationalismus und Öffentlichkeit im Zarenreich
1855–1875 (Cologne, 2000), 210–37.
14 Karel Durman, The Time of the Thunderer: Mikhail Katkov, Russian Nationalist Ex-
tremism and the Failure of the Bismarckian System, 1871–1887 (Boulder, CO, 1988), 88–
218.
15 Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (New York, 1960), 170–74; Mi-
chael Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism (Westport, CT, 1985), 151, 258–
63.
16 S. A. Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety v Rossii v 1856–1876 godakh (Moscow, 1960),
320–31.
17 Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy
from Peter the Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II (Princeton, NJ, 2006), 229–30.
18 Durman, The Time of the Thunderer, 219–66.
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AIn their efforts to advance a more aggressive Russian foreign policy in the
Balkans—and to challenge the unsatisfactory settlement of the Russo-Turkish
War of 1877–78—Pan-Slavic activists looked abroad for help. Perhaps the
most inﬂuential activist who operated outside of Russia was Olga Novikova, a
representative of an elite noble clan and the London correspondent for Katkov’s
Moskovskie vedomosti.19 Novikova established a legendary salon at Claridge’s
Hotel and made frequent contributions to the British press. In both capacities,
she worked to improve British opinions of the Russian Empire, ultimately earning
a reputation as “the M.P. for Russia.”20 For example, she denied that Pan-Slavism
demonstrated Russia’s lust for imperial expansion, reframing the movement as a
Russian variation on the continent-wide struggle for self-determination—a
cause that British liberals held dear.21 In Paris, Princess Liza Trubetskaia, another
Pan-Slavic activist from an ancient family, operated a salon that cooperated
closely with Novikova’s. Capitalizing on France’s vulnerability in the wake
of the Franco-Prussian war, Trubetskaia sought to convince the republic’s lead-
ers that friendly relations between France and Russia could protect both from
German aggression.22
Novikova and Trubetskaia managed to sway several inﬂuential policy mak-
ers. William Gladstone, the once and future prime minister, was a regular at
Novikova’s gatherings. By 1876, under the inﬂuence of his Russian friend,
he expressed interest in improving Anglo-Russian relations and echoed Pan-
Slavic activists’ views on the “Eastern Question.”23 Adolphe Thiers, the second
president of the Third Republic, became close to Trubetskaia and eventually en-
dorsed the salonnière’s arguments in favor of a Franco-Russian rapproche-
ment.24 Several high-ranking French ofﬁcials shared the president’s interest
in pursuing an alliance with Russia, including France’s ambassadors to Russia
in the 1870s (both generals) and Raoul de Boisdeffre, who served as a military
attaché to the embassy in St. Petersburg.2519 Joseph O. Baylen, “Madame Olga Novikov, Propagandist,” American Slavic and
East European Review 10, no. 4 (1951): 255–71. One of Novikova’s brothers was the
ﬁrst Russian volunteer to die ﬁghting in Serbia.
20 This phrase was coined by one of Novikova’s critics, but she ultimately embraced
it. W. T. Stead, The M.P. for Russia, 2 vols. (London, 1909), 1:v.
21 For example, O. K., “M. Katkoff and the ‘Moscow Gazette,’” Northern Echo, De-
cember 3, 1877, 3; O. K., “A Chapter from Russian History,” December 12, 1877, 3.
Novikova frequently wrote under the pen name “O. K.” (Kireeva was her maiden name.)
22 Jules Hansen, Les coulisses de la diplomatie (Paris, 1880), 319–20.
23 See W. E. Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London,
1876).
24 Daniel Halévy, Le Courrier de M. Thiers (Paris, 1921), 471–82.
25 Edmond Toutain, Alexandre III et la République Française (Paris, 1929), 20–21;
Gen. Le-Flô, “Imperator Aleksandr II i Frantsiia v 1875 g.,” Russkaia starina 23, no. 1
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ABack-channel lobbying—a technique that Pan-Slavic activists had perfected
in Russia—yielded encouraging results in western Europe. However, the neg-
ative opinions of Russia that prevailed among Europe’s liberal powers con-
strained the political opportunities of Pan-Slavic activists. Critical of the tsarist
regime’s abuses of its growing legions of political prisoners, both Britain and
France offered asylum to thousands of Russian socialists, populists, anarchists,
and nihilists.26 (Indeed, France’s 1880 refusal to extradite a refugee who had
attempted to assassinate the tsar created a major diplomatic row with Rus-
sia.)27 A wave of pogroms in 1881–82 further damaged Russia’s reputation,
leading journalists to blame the tsarist regime for the violence and the Paris-
based Alliance Israélite Universelle to assist the emigration of more than ten
thousand Russian Jews.28 In light of these challenges, even the most ardent sup-
porters of a rapprochement conceded that it was a lost cause. A frustrated
Trubetskaia eventually disbanded her salon and returned to Russia.29
Reviving the Prospects of a Rapprochement
In the 1880s, two interlocking venues revived the campaign for Franco-Russian
friendship initiated by Pan-Slavic activists. The ﬁrst was the salon of Juliette
Adam. Adam, the daughter of a provincial doctor, moved to Paris in the 1850s,
where she became active in the capital’s republican opposition and in the salon
of the writer and political activist Madame d’Agoult (who published under the
pen nameDaniel Stern).Having penned a feminist critique of Proudhonwhile still
in her twenties, she went on towrite paeans toKossuth,Mazzini, and Garibaldi as
well as a novel that celebrated the erotic exploits of a self-professed “pagan(1892): 197–215; Kennan, Fateful Alliance, 11–17. Boisdeffre, of course, would go on
to gain infamy by ordering the arrest of Alfred Dreyfus.
26 Bernard Porter, The Refugee Question in Mid-Victorian Politics (New York, 1979),
16–19; Greg Burgess, Refuge in the Land of Liberty: A History of Asylum and Refugee
Protection in France since the Revolution (New York, 2008), 125–32.
27 “Note sur l’affaire Hartmann,” 1880. Manuscript in the collection of Bibliothèque
Nationale de France.
28 On European responses to the 1881–82 pogroms, see John Klier, Russians, Jews,
and the Pogrom Crisis of 1881–1882 (New York, 2011), 365–83. On the alliance, see
Lisa Moses Leff, Sacred Bonds of Solidarity: The Rise of Jewish Internationalism in
Nineteenth-Century France (Stanford, CA, 2006); Paula Hyman, The Jews of Modern
France (Berkeley, 1998), 77–90.
29 Hansen, Les coulisses, 320. For discussions of these challenges from the French dip-
lomats who supported a rapprochement, see report of Ambassador Le-Flô, January 11,
1872, in Archives diplomatiques (hereafter AD), Affaires diverses politiques, Russie,
112CP/246; and report of Ambassador Chanzy, May 7, 1881, AD, Affaires diverses
politiques, Russie, 112CP/264, 136–41.
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Awoman” ( païenne) who ﬂouted religious and social conventions.30 After the
death of her ﬁrst husband in the 1860s, she married Edmond Adam, a ﬁnancier,
journalist, and rising star within republican circles.31
By the late 1860s, the Adams had become one of Paris’s most well-connected
and politically active couples. In 1864, Juliette established a salon of her own on
the Boulevard Poissonière.32 In 1870, at the height of the Franco-Prussian War,
Edmond was appointed the prefect of the Paris police—a powerful position that
reported directly to the minister of the interior. The Adams remained in the cap-
ital during the deadly German siege; both engaged in patriotic activism and es-
tablished warm relations with the leaders of the Paris Commune.33 The couple
was particularly close to the communard and radical journalist Henri Rochefort.
In the aftermath of the war, when Rochefort was arrested for his participation in
the commune, the couple defended him. Remaining in contact with him during
his exile in New Caledonia, they raised money to assist him after he escaped
from the island in 1874.34
Juliette Adam’s gathering ﬂourished in the two decades after the war. In the
grand tradition of the French salon, it was a center of cultural and intellectual
exchange, frequented by ﬁgures such as George Sand, Anatole France, Gustave
Flaubert, Alexandre Dumas ﬁls, and Pierre Loti.35 Adam’s salon also had an
overtly political function as a brain trust for the republican politician Léon Gam-
betta, who served as prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in the early
1880s. It was in Adam’s gathering that Gambetta’s followers (the so-called Op-
portunists) crafted the strategy that allowed them to unite peasants and the urban
bourgeoisie in a republican coalition—a success that forestalled the ongoing
threat of a royalist restoration by producing a permanent republican majority.36
Although it is unclear whether the salonnière personally engineered the politi-
cian’s rise to power, as she claimed, Adam’s intimacy with Gambetta earned her
gathering a reputation as the “premier political salon in Paris.”3730 Juliette Adam, Mes premières armes littéraires et politiques (Paris, 1904).
31 Winifred Stephens Whale,Madame Adam (Juliette Lamber), la grande Française
(New York, 1917), 52–62.
32 Ibid., 98–124.
33 Juliette Adam, Le siège de Paris, journal d’une Parisienne (Paris, 1873).
34 Juliette Adam, Nos amitiés politiques avant l’abandon de la Revanche (Paris,
1888), 12–24, 108–12.
35 For overviews of salon culture, see Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A
Cultural History of the French Enlightenment (Ithaca, NY, 1994); Steven D. Kale,
French Salons: High Society and Political Sociability from the Old Regime to the Rev-
olution of 1848 (Baltimore, 2004).
36 Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Juliette Adam, 1836–1936: L’Instigatrice (Paris,
2001), 67–122.
37 Juliette Adam, Mes angoisses et nos luttes (Paris, 1907), 168–70. The quote is
from Montjoyeux, “Indiscrétions Parisiennes,” Le Gaulois, October 1, 1879, 1.
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AIn spite of Adam’s strong republican credentials, she expressed growing con-
cern about France’s future by the late 1870s and early 1880s. Noting that previ-
ous republican governments had struggled to navigate between revolutionary
chaos and oligarchic self-interest, to strike a balance between popular democracy
and the need for social order, shewondered if the ThirdRepublicwouldmanage to
evade the pitfalls that had toppled its predecessors.38 Adam was even more
alarmed by the defeatist attitudes that she believed had taken hold in France after
Germany’s victory in the Franco-Prussian War and Bismarck’s annexation of Al-
sace and Lorraine. Questioning the value of the “internationalism, cosmopolitan-
ism, humanitarianism” that republicans had long claimed to hold dear, she became
one of France’s most impassioned proponents of la Revanche, insisting that the
republic should stop at nothing to reclaim its lost territories.39
Adam maintained that the solution to France’s present dilemmas could be
found in its ancient traditions. She believed that the French had inherited a “sen-
timent of fraternity and a passion for liberty” from Latin civilization and a mar-
tial tradition of equality from Gaul. Rekindling both cultures, she argued, could
strengthen a nation that faced a powerful external enemy as well as internal chal-
lenges.40 Although her ideas reframed republican traditions in a nativist vein, she
insisted that France must seek help from abroad. Adam, who had befriended
both Trubetskaia and Novikova in Paris’s salon scene, was impressed by the
Pan-Slavs’ anti-German mettle, and she concluded that the tsarist empire could
play a constructive role in France’s regeneration.41 “Russia is the only force that
can render us anything other than victims without dignity or dupes,” she wrote.42
“A passionate and ﬁerce foe of Germany,” she explained elsewhere, “I was log-
ically a Slavophile. I would even dare to call myself a pan-Slavist.”43
At ﬁrst, Adam relied on Gambetta to promote a rapprochement between
France and Russia.44 However, the salonnière’s longtime friend, like most main-
stream republicans, expressed misgivings about aligning France with an auto-
cratic regime.45 After a bitter public dispute in which she denounced Gambetta
as a Germanophile, Adam turned to a new tool of inﬂuence: the media. In 1879,38 Juliette Adam, “Will the French Republic Last?,” Scribner’s Monthly 20, no. 4
(1880): 522–24.
39 Quote from Juliette Adam, Mes sentiments et nos idées avant 1870 (Paris, 1905),
471; see also Juliette Adam, Après l’abandon de la revanche (Paris, 1910), 380.
40 “A nos lecteurs,” La Nouvelle Revue (hereafter LNR) 1, no. 1 (1879): 10–11.
41 JosephO. Baylen, “Mme. Juliette Adam,Gambetta, and the Idea of a Franco-Russian
Alliance,” Arts and Sciences Studies 57, no. 15 (1960): 5; “Un dîner chezM. de Girardin,”
Le Gaulois, October 20, 1879, 1.
42 Adam, Après l’abandon, 147.
43 Adam, Nos Amitiés, 166.
44 Élie de Cyon, Histoire de l’entente franco-russe, 1886–1894 (Paris, 1895), 29–30.
45 Baylen, “Mme. Juliette Adam,” 7–8.
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Ashe founded La Nouvelle Revue, a monthly journal that promised to carry on the
“battle against Bismarck and for the Russian alliance by means of the pen.”46
That publication would allow Adam to introduce her ideas to a broader public.
The French security forces were the second actor that advocated for better
relations between Russia and France in the 1880s. Juliette Adam was intimately
connected to this world through her husband, Edmond, the ex-prefect of police,
and through her relationship with Louis Andrieux, who headed the prefecture
between 1879 and 1881. A veteran of the republican opposition under the Sec-
ond Empire and the founder of Le Petit Parisien, Paris’s most popular daily,
Andrieux was a regular at Adam’s salon.47 Sharing the salonnière’s interest
in improving relations with Russia, Andrieux systematically undermined the
rights of the Russian revolutionaries who had sought refuge in Paris. Charac-
terizing the émigrés as dangerous agitators who aimed “to overthrow all author-
ity,” he insisted that the French and Russian states shared a “common interest”
in policing their activities.48 In 1880, at the request of the Russian government,
Andrieux expelled from the French capital Russian subjects suspected of har-
boring revolutionary sympathies.49
Collaboration between the prefecture and the tsarist state continued to deepen
over the next decade. After the 1881 assassination of Tsar Alexander II, An-
drieux assisted the Russian police investigators and conservative vigilantes
who traveled to Paris to incapacitate the revolutionary circles that had sought
asylum there; in addition to sharing intelligence, he offered the services of his
agents to help the Russians.50 In 1883, the Russian Okhrana, or secret political
police, opened a new ofﬁce in Paris that was tasked with monitoring the activ-
ities of Russian radicals living abroad. The Paris Okhrana, which worked out of
the Russian embassy, enjoyed substantial logistical support from the prefecture
of police as well as from France’s national security forces, the Sûreté.51 As we46 For Adam’s account of their falling out, see “Madame Juliette Adam chez elle,”
L’éclair, April 13, 1891, in Archives de la Préfecture de Police (hereafter APP)
EA29. The quote is from Adam, Après l’abandon, 380.
47 Louis Andrieux, A travers la République (Paris, 1926), 156–57.
48 Louis Andrieux, Souvenirs d’un préfet de police (Paris, 1885), 199. See also
Konstitutsiia Loris-Melikova i ego chastnye pis’ma (St. Petersburg, 1906), 49–51. Adam
shared Andrieux’s negative views of Russian radicals, claiming that they played into
Bismarck’s hand by working to weaken Russia: Juliette Adam, “Lettres sur la politique
extérieure,” LNR 3, no. 10 (1881): 957.
49 Agent Mercier to Baranov, July 21/August 2, 1880, Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv
Rossiiskoi federatsii (hereafter GARF), f. 109, op. 3a, d. 711, ll. 71–72ob.
50 See, for example, undated memorandum to M. T. Loris-Melikov, in GARF, f. 109,
op. 3a, d. 711, ll. 10–14; V. Ia. Bogucharskii, Iz istorii politicheskoi bor’by v 70-kh i 80-kh
gg. XIX veka (Moscow, 1912), 268–303.
51 For the Sûreté’s overview of this relationship, see “La police russe en France,” Ar-
chives Nationales (hereafter AN) F 7 14605. Although extensive cooperation between
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Ashall see, this agency did not limit its activities to monitoring and inﬁltrating rev-
olutionary cells. It would become a key participant in the dialogues emerging
from Adam’s salon and would actively attempt to shape public opinion about
the tsarist regime and the Russian émigrés who sought refuge in France.
Conversion and Convergence
The culture of the French salon revolved around the salonnière’s ability to forge
harmony out of dissonance through the art of polite discussion.52 Juliette Adam
excelled at this task. Having incorporated elements drawn from the left and the
right in her own thought, which infused republican traditions with nativist and
militaristic ideas, she continued the dialogue between these two poles in her sa-
lon, which attracted a diverse circle of associates. Rochefort, the left-wing ﬁre-
brand, returned to Paris after Communards were granted amnesty in 1880, re-
sumed his engagement with Adam, and founded a newspaper of his own,
L’Instransigeant. He shared the salonnière’s interest in rekindling French patri-
otism, although he tended to highlight social inequality and capitalist exploita-
tion as the main causes of the republic’s ills.53 Adam’s gathering also attracted
prominent conservatives, among them Lucien Millevoye, a lawyer with monar-
chist leanings who operated a network of provincial newspapers, and Alphonse
Daudet, a fervent opponent of the republic.54 Finally, several members of the sa-
lon in the 1880s were, like Adam, former republicans who had begun to migrate
to the right. In addition to Andrieux, Paul Déroulède belonged to this camp. A
poet, a veteran of the Franco-Prussian war, and a one-time associate of Gambet-
ta, he founded the arch-revanchist League of Patriots in 1882with Adam’s ﬁnan-
cial support.55
Adam also boasted several international collaborators. She remained in close
contact with Novikova, who visited the salon when she was in Paris and con-
tributed to La Nouvelle Revue.56 Besides Novikova, Adam’s most important in-
ternational collaborator was Jules Hansen, a Dane who had ﬂed to Paris and
found work as an intelligence operative in the French Ministry of Foreign Af-national police forces became standard practice with the rise of anarchism in the 1890s,
Franco-Russian cooperation preceded this trend. See Hsi-huey Liang, The Rise of Mod-
ern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War
(New York, 1992), 112–50.
52 Kale, French Salons, 21–22.
53 Noële Roubaud, Henri Rochefort intime (Paris, 1954), 116–26.
54 Saad Morcos, Juliette Adam (Beirut, 1962), 111–52, 465 n. 139.
55 Camille Ducray, Paul Déroulède, 1846–1914 (Paris, 1914), 156.
56 Morcos, Juliette Adam, 43, 512–13 n. 168; Louis Leger, “Chez les slaves mério-
dionaux,” LNR 4, no. 19 (1882): 809; Olga de Novikoff, “En Angleterre,” LNR 18, no. 99
(1896): 30–51.
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Afairs after Bismarck annexed his native Holstein.57 Hansen shared the salon-
nière’s commitment to seeking revenge on Germany, and he too had an interest
in Russia. A childhood friend of Princess Dagmar of Schleswig-Holstein, who
went on to marry the future tsar Alexander III, Hansen maintained a cordial re-
lationship with the tsar and tsarina and frequently visited them in Copenhagen,
where they spent many of their vacations.58
Adam’s admirers marveled at the salonnière’s ability to facilitate exchange
between the diverse individuals who frequented her gathering, and they cele-
brated her skill at reconciling the public sphere of men and the private world
of women, aesthetic beauty and the naked self-interest of politics.59 Her goal
to cultivate a friendship between the Third Republic and the tsarist regime,
which she would pursue tirelessly, might be read as her most ambitious effort
to create a harmonious synthesis between divergent systems and ideas. She
championed the common interests of the two countries in combating German
aggression and the emergent threat of international terrorism in her salon as well
as in the pages of La Nouvelle Revue.60 She organized banquets and lectures to
educate French citizens about Russia and promoted authors who presented Rus-
sian history and politics in a positive light.61 Adam ultimately enlisted many
members of her salon in her efforts to “sell”Russia and its culture to a republican
audience. In addition to advancing her campaign of public diplomacy and cul-
tural translation, Adam’s associates worked to create new points of convergence
in the political cultures of France and Russia. For example, Déroulède penned a
Russian-themed play that enjoyed a successful run at Paris’s Odéon theater. A
celebration of the efforts of early modern Cossacks to free themselves from Pol-
ish domination, the play was also read by some observers as an allegory of the
plight of the Alsatians under German rule. If the Alsatians could emulate the
Cossacks’ patriotic fervor and their willingness to sacriﬁce themselves for their
homeland, Déroulède suggested, they could eventually triumph in their struggle
for self-determination.6257 Hansen, Les coulisses, 180. Hansen explicitly compared the plight of Schleswig-
Holstein to that of Alsace-Lorraine. Jules Hansen, A travers la diplomatie (1864–1867)
(Paris, 1875), iii.
58 Jules Hansen, L’Alliance Franco-Russe (Paris, 1897), 18–21; “Auto-biographie de
M. Jules Hansen,” AD, Jules Hansen personal ﬁle, 393QO/2006.
59 “Les femmes qui écrivent,” Le Gaulois, July 1, 1883, in APP EA29.
60 For example, “Guerre russo-turque d’après des documents inédits,” LNR 2, no. 4
(1880): 473–506; “Lettres sur la politique extérieure,” LNR 3, no. 10 (1881): 956–58.
61 See, for example, the records of the Franco-Russian Literary and Artistic Associ-
ation, which Adam founded: Lilly Library, Indiana University, Juliette Adam Papers,
folders 13 and 14.
62 The play is Paul Déroulède, L’Hetman (Paris, 1877). On the play as an allegory,
Ducray, Paul Déroulède, 129–30.
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AIn the early 1880s, Adam added new Russian associates to her circle. Partic-
ipating in her efforts to demystify Russia, they also inﬂuenced the ideological
evolution of her network. One of these Russians, Princess Catherine Radziwill,
was the product of an illustrious Polish noble family from Ukraine and a vet-
eran of the Pan-Slavic movement. She spent the 1870s in Berlin, where her hus-
band (also a Polish aristocrat) occupied an ancestral estate. A Catholic, she be-
came an outspoken opponent of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf. Radziwill moved to
St. Petersburg in the 1880s and spent part of the 1890s in London, but she re-
mained in contact with Adam through letters and visits.63
Another addition to Adam’s circle, Iustin’ia Glinka, had served for decades as
a lady-in-waiting to the tsarina. In 1880, Glinka moved to Paris, where she
launched a one-woman crusade to undermine its Russian radicals.64 She inﬁltrated
nihilist circles, gathering compromising information on the émigrés; having be-
friended Andrieux, she used her access to the prefect to orchestrate a lobbying
campaign against political “refugees.”65 She contacted French media outlets as
well as the prefecture to claim that nihilists had brazenly attacked her on the streets
of Paris and to express her outrage that the republican government continued to
offer the “right of asylum” to “a group of foreign malefactors.”66
The most crucial addition to the Adam circle in the 1880s was Il’ia Tsion.
Born into a modest Jewish family in present-day Lithuania, Tsion went on to
earn a medical degree in Germany. In the 1860s, he accepted a position in a pres-
tigious Leipzig laboratory, where he discovered the nerve that stimulates the
heart (still called “Cyon’s nerve” in his honor). Having gained international ac-
claimwhile still in his twenties, Tsion accepted a professorship in St. Petersburg.
(Jewswere barred from the Russian professoriate, but Tsion had converted to the
Russian Orthodox faith while living in Germany, which enabled him to accept
the position.)67 Although he had been active in socialist groups as a student, he
grew more conservative as a young professor.68 Sometime in the early 1870s he
met Katkov, with whom he discussed his alarm about “the materialist and rev-
olutionary current” that he saw as prevalent within the Russian intelligentsia.6963 Catherine Radziwill, My Recollections (New York, 1904); Catherine Radziwill,
Memories of Forty Years (New York, 1915).
64 For biographical details, see Lev Aronov, Henryk Baran, and Dmitri Zubarev, “To-
ward the Prehistory of the Protocols,” in The Global Impact of “The Protocols of the
Elders of Zion”: A Century-Old Myth, ed. Esther Webman (New York, 2012), 27–43.
65 “Extrait d’un rapport du contrôle général,” December 23, 1881, APP BA926.
66 “Une mystériuse affaire,” Le Figaro, July 22, 1881, 3; Glinka to Prefect of Police,
June 18, 1881, in APP BA926.
67 For general biographical information, see George F. Kennan, “The Curious Mon-
sieur Cyon,” American Scholar 55, no. 4 (1986): 449–75.
68 I. Tsion, Nigilisty i nigilizm (Moscow, 1886), 23–24.
69 Cyon, Histoire, 122.
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AIn an 1873 lecture at his university, Tsion suggested that a whole series of sub-
conscious stimuli affected the functioning of the heart, concluding that the human
body was a divine creation whose mysteries would never be fully understood.70
Outraged young positivists initiated a public campaign against the professor,
and in light of the controversy he had fomented, the institution refused to renew
his contract.71 Tsion’s efforts to appeal his case and to publicize his story failed,
leading him to conclude that a liberal conspiracy had seized control of the Russian
academy, press, and government.72 Declaring himself a “refugee” from Russian
liberalism, Tsion ﬂed to Paris, taking French citizenship in 1881.73
Upon his arrival in France, Tsion—who henceforth would go by a rather af-
fected French version of his name, Élie de Cyon—attempted to rehabilitate his
scholarly career. He accepted a temporary position in the laboratory of the
physiologist Paul Bert; colleagues promised that he would soon receive an ap-
pointment at the Collège de France. However, Cyon became embroiled in con-
ﬂict with his new boss, who was a devoted positivist, an anticlericalist, and a
republican delegate to the National Assembly. In 1878, Cyon learned that he
would not receive an academic position in France after all—a development that
he attributed to Bert’s meddling.74 His academic dreams dashed, Cyon opened a
private medical practice and began to work as a journalist on the side, becoming
a regular contributor to Katkov’sMoskovskie vedomosti and the author of many
pamphlets, essays, and articles directed at French audiences. In 1882, using his
wife’s fortune, he acquired editorial control of the French monarchist daily Le
Gaulois.75
Cyon acquired a scandalous reputation in his adoptive homeland. Critics
charged that he had absconded with an actress after spending his wife’s fortune
and that he had physically assaulted a famous Russian artist who was visiting
Paris.76 But if many regarded the journalist as an unstable scoundrel, Juliette
Adam found something to admire in his personality. Cyon lived a life full of
conversions that reconciled seemingly contradictory life experiences: he was
a Jewwho became Russian Orthodox, aman of the left who turned conservative,
a scientist who chose mysticism over positivism, and a Russian subject who
adopted a new identity in France. Multilingual and equally conversant in French70 This episode is recounted in Tsion, Nigilisty i nigilizm, 14–15; “G. Tsion o
nihilizme i ‘Russkaia mysl’ ob idealizme,” inM. N. Katkov: Sobranie sochinenii v shesti
tomakh, ed. A. N. Nikoliukin and T. F. Prokopov (St. Petersburg, 2010), 1:713.
71 “Strannye protivorechiia,” Otechestvennye zapiski 215, no. 8 (1874), sec. 2:123–56.
72 Tsion, Nigilisty, 15–19.
73 Morcos, Juliette Adam, 500 n. 107.
74 Kennan, “Curious Monsieur Cyon,” 460; Cyon, Histoire, 181.
75 Report of agent H-, July 1, 1882, in APP BA1023, 15.
76 Unidentiﬁed newspaper clipping, October 25, 1881, in APP BA1023, 7; report of
Agent Dumont, August 5, 1892, in ibid, 54.
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Aand Russian culture, Cyon had much to offer to Adam’s efforts to forge a bond
between the republic and the autocracy. The salonnière and the Russian émigré
became close friends and collaborators, and by 1887 Cyon would assume con-
trol of La Nouvelle Revue from Adam.
The ﬁnal Russian of note who entered Adam’s orbit in the 1880s was Piotr
Rachkovskii, the visionary second director of the Paris Okhrana. An impover-
ished noble who hailed from Ukraine, Rachkovskii had experienced several
conversions of his own. In the late 1870s, when he was working as a journalist,
Rachkovskii was implicated in a revolutionary conspiracy. Threatened with ar-
rest, he agreed to become a police informant in exchange for the charges against
him being dropped. The one-time suspect proved an immensely capable clan-
destine agent, and in 1885, at the age of thirty-two, Rachkovskii secured the
key post in Paris—a position that he would hold for the next thirty years.77
Thanks to his personal familiarity with the political underground, Rach-
kovskii understood the psychological burdens that Russian émigrés carried.
He used sabotage, blackmail, and a network of double agents to demoralize rad-
icals and to convince them to abandon their activities.78 Drawing on his experi-
ence in journalism, he also understood that public opinion played a key role in
the Russian government’s struggle against revolutionaries. Endeavoring to build
sympathy for the tsarist government among the European public, he organized a
formal press agency that published pamphlets, paid Western journalists to write
stories that portrayed the autocracy in a positive light, and even placed its own
agents at media outlets.79 French security ofﬁcials, who continued to maintain a
warm relationship with the Russian police during Rachkovskii’s tenure, praised
the cunning and “zeal” of the Okhrana chief, remarking that “he was treated as a
equal by the very highest French ofﬁcials.”80
Although it is unclear whether Rachkovskii himself visited Adam’s salon, he
engaged with many of its associates and participated in the discussions that they
initiated.81 Jules Hansen was among Rachkovskii’s most valued colleagues: he
helped the Okhrana chief to correct grammatical errors in his French-language
publications and to place his agents at European media outlets, and he would
even become the editor of an Okhrana-funded newspaper by the turn of the cen-77 For biographical information, see “Kar’era P. I. Rachkovskogo: Dokumenty,” Byloe
30, no. 2 (1918): 78–87; V. S. Brachev, Mastera politicheskogo syska dorevoliutsionnoi
Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1998), 12–39.
78 Frederic S. Zuckerman, The Tsarist Secret Police Abroad: Policing Europe in a
Modernising World (New York, 2002), 82–150.
79 Records of the Okhrana press agency can be found in the Hoover Archive (here-
after HA), Zagranichnaia okhrana (hereafter ZO), index IXb, reel 134, folders 1–1C.
80 “La police russe,” AN F 7 14605.
81 Rachkovskii’s agents also monitored the circle: see outgoing dispatch of May 18/30,
1887, HA, ZO, index XIIIb(1), reel 189, folder 1.
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Atury.82 Rachkovskii also maintained warm relations with Le Petit Parisien, the
paper founded by Andrieux, which was one of France’s most pro-Russian dai-
lies.83
Juliette Adam’s engagement with Russian associates, as we shall see, helped to
facilitate the diplomatic rapprochement. At the same time, it instigated open-
ended discussions about governance and culture across borders that ultimately en-
tangled French and Russian politics. Beginning in the early 1880s, Adam, Rad-
ziwill, Cyon, Glinka, and Novikova collaborated on a series of dispatches from
Europe’s capitals that were published by La Nouvelle Revue. Passed off as “un-
published letters” penned by a Russian diplomat named Count Paul Vasili, they
were ﬁlled with salacious gossip about the continent’s beau monde. The ﬁrst dis-
patch, “Berlin Society” (1884), was soon followed by reports fromVienna (1885),
London (1885), St. Petersburg (1886), Paris (1887), and other cities.84
The consumers of the “Society” series, which went on to be translated into
several languages, seem to have most appreciated its scandalous disclosures.85
Yet serious political agendas lurked behind the titillating content of the dis-
patches. Each advanced Adam’s revanchist program, excoriating Bismarck as
well as the European politicians whom the contributors to the series accused
of acquiescing to the chancellor’s every whim. “Vasili’s” depiction of Europe’s
capitals through Russian eyes also afforded Adam and her associates the oppor-
tunity to present their own critiques of continental society. The contributors to
the “Society” series aligned themselves with the “working masses,” expressing
sympathy for the plight of Irish peasants and German workers.86 But they also
launched vigorous attacks on the liberal system, charging that the self-satisfac-
tion of Western liberals had prevented meaningful reforms and that parliamen-
tary democracy and capitalism had betrayed the interests of ordinary people in-
stead of advancing them.87 “Vasili’s” opinions thus melded the republican
devotion to mass politics with the skepticism toward liberal institutions and ide-
as expressed by Katkov and Pan-Slavic activists.
In later works, Adam’s Russian interlocutors expanded on their critiques of
the liberal order. Cyon charged that capitalism and individualism had created an82 V. K. Agafonov, Zagranichnaia Okhranka (Petrograd, 1918), 34–36; Departament
obshchikh del to I. F. Manasevich-Manuilov, January 13, 1904, HA, ZO, index IXb, reel
134, folder 1C.
83 HA, ZO, index IXa, reel 135, box 67.
84 Morcos, Juliette Adam, 286–88.
85 See, e.g., Baron Pierre, “Au Comte Paul Wassili,” Le Gaulois, November 11,
1883, 2.
86 The quote is from Comte Paul Vasili, La société de Londres (Paris, 1885), 97. On
Irish: ibid., 213–14; on German workers: Comte Paul Vasili, La société de Berlin (1884),
119–27.
87 Vasili, La société de Londres, 176–89.
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Aunjust society driven by self-interest and riddled with animosity, that parlia-
mentarianism only encouraged radicalism, and that the republican project of
laïcité had given rise to a full-ﬂedged “war against God” that had corroded
France’s national traditions.88 A pamphlet published by Rachkovskii echoed
Cyon’s ideas. Concluding that the republic’s claims to promote liberty, equality,
and fraternity were nothing more than an “illusion,” he complained that a cap-
italist oligarchy had merely replaced the old landed aristocracy overthrown in
1789. Bemoaning the pitiful conditions in which French workers and peasants
lived, Rachkovskii presented suffering, injustice, and anarchy as natural by-
products of the liberal system.89
In an era in which antisemitism remained conﬁned to the fringes of acceptable
political discourse in France, the Russians who surroundedAdam carried out ag-
gressive attacks on Jews.90 “Paul Vasili’s”works contained long passages blam-
ing Jews for the injustices of capitalism.91 Novikova went so far as to describe
the Russian pogroms as a laudable popular rebellion against “Jewish usurers.”92
Adam’s Russian interlocutors were also early proponents of political anti-
semitism, claiming that Jews were responsible for the failings of the liberal sys-
tem as well as for revolutionary disorder. Awork attributed to Rachkovskii ar-
gued that the French experience had proved that Jews were “charlatans of
liberalism.” Instead of serving the nation that had emancipated them in 1791,
he charged, French Jews maintained their “system of exclusive existence” and
“their [separate] nationality through the shameful means of usury.”93 Mean-
while, pamphlets produced by the Okhrana insisted that Jews dominated the
ranks of the Russian radicals who sought refuge in Paris. Embellishing Glinka’s
earlier denunciations of this group with antisemitic language, Okhrana-authored
works expressed outrage that these “criminals” beneﬁted from the republic’s lib-88 See Élie de Cyon, La Russie contemporaine (Paris, 1892), 144–46; Élie de Cyon,
La guerre à Dieu et la morale laïque: Réponse à M. Paul Bert (Paris, 1881). The ﬁrst
publication is a collection of articles that Cyon published in the French press in the
1880s.
89 Jehan-Préval, Anarchie et Nihilisme (Paris, 1892), 106–79, quote from 176–77.
This pamphlet is a response to a work that Cyon published in Russian called Nihilism
and Anarchy. For the attribution to Rachkovskii, see Henri Rollin, L’Apocalypse de no-
tre temps (Paris, 2005 [original 1939]), 598–606.
90 In 1882 Le Figaro wrote, “The kind of anti-Semitic movement that exists in cer-
tain regions of the earth would be the object of public ridicule in France.” Cited in Léon
Poliakov, The History of Anti-Semitism, trans. George Klin (Philadelphia, 2003), 4:39.
91 Vasili, La société de Londres, 420–23; Vasili, La société de Berlin, 154–62, 190–
99.
92 O. K., Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause (London, 1883), 363–64.
93 Kalikst Wolski, La Russie juive (Paris, 1887), 41–42. For the attribution, see
Pierre-André Taguieff, Les Protocoles des sages de Sion (Paris, 2004), 293–94.
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Aeral asylum laws, which supposedly had been created by Jews to beneﬁt their co-
confessionalists.94
If Adam’s Russian interlocutors painted a bleak portrait of a continent threat-
ened by Jewish plots, “parliamentary follies, liberal musings, socialist aspira-
tions, and anarchist tendencies,”95 they presented Russia’s autocratic system
as a laudable alternative to liberalism and capitalism. Cyon insisted that autoc-
racy elegantly reconciled the need for social order with the interests of the
masses. Contrasting the Russian model to France’s ancien régime, which he
claimed had been driven by crude self-interest, he described the former as a sys-
tem guided by popular “acclamation.”96 Although tsarist subjects did not enjoy
“political rights,” their leader invested them with “political duties,” forming a
social contract that obligated each Russian “to defend the rights of the supreme
authority and to tend to the interests of the state.”97 The autocracy, in turn, repaid
its debt to its subjects by promoting “liberty for citizens and progress for insti-
tutions.” (For those whomight challenge his portrayal of autocracy as a progres-
sive force, he pointed to the alacrity with which Alexander II had emancipated
tens of millions of serfs.)98 Autocracy, according to Cyon, produced a harmoni-
ous society that strove for equality and justice; by contrast, “the emancipation of
individual initiative” in liberal Europe only encouraged unbridled egoism. “In
Europe,” he wrote, “Communism is only the utopia of a few dreamers. But in
Russia, where the vast majority of peasants recognize only collective ownership
[propriété collective], [Communism] has existed from time immemorial.”99
Others in Adam’s network echoed Cyon’s argument that Russia’s autocrats
had discovered the most efﬁcient means of balancing the need for social order
with the interests of the masses. Novikova argued that autocracy was best
equipped to enact “speedy and drastic reforms” that could beneﬁt the population
at large.100 Rachkovskii went further still, presenting autocracy as a manifesta-
tion of true mass “democracy.”101 Claiming that Russians’ strong traditions of
communalism and their devotion to the service state promoted “philanthropic
ideas that often efface and reduce class distinctions,” he concluded that “the94 P. Ivanov, Confession d’un nihiliste, précédée d’une étude sur les nihilistes en
général (Paris, 1887), 5, 14–15; Wolski, La Russie juive, 2, 255. Notes in the Okhrana
archive reveal that the ﬁrst work was authored by Rachkovskii’s agents. See HA, ZO,
index XVIa–XVIb(1), box 189, folder 3.
95 The words are Cyon’s (La Russie, 15).
96 Élie de Cyon, Nihilisme et anarchie (Paris, 1892), 286. This is an expanded and
translated version of Cyon’s 1886 Nigilisty i nigilizm.
97 Excerpt from 1886 letter to Katkov, cited in Élie de Cyon, M. Witte et les ﬁnances
russes (Paris, 1895), vii.
98 Quote from Cyon, Nihilisme et anarchie, 290; see also Cyon, La Russie, 66–67.
99 “Que faire?,” LNR 4, no. 16 (1882): 250, 247.
100 O. K., Skobeleff, 338; see also 376–77, 403.
101 Jehan-Préval, Anarchie, 124.
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ARussian worker and the Russian peasant are much happier than their French
brothers.” The citizens of “republican France” should “envy” the autocracy,
he added.102
These boosters of the autocracy differed as to whether its achievements could
be replicated beyond Russia’s borders. Novikova viewed Russia’s political sys-
tem as an expression of centuries-old traditions; Russian values and practices
therefore could not simply be implanted on foreign soil.103 Rachkovskii and
Cyon, by contrast, insisted that the continent could learn fromRussia’s example.
The Okhrana chief argued that Europe’s “Aryans” could draw inspiration from
the tsarist empire’s long-running struggle against “the Semitic world” [sémi-
tisme].104 Cyon vested Russia with a “high and noble mission”: “It is up to
her to prove that a hereditary and absolute power . . . is perfectly compatible with
all beneﬁcent advances, with all civil liberties, that it is the best safeguard of
rights for all, and the political institution best suited to protect the weak and
to improve the lot of the poor. . . . Standing above every internal division, every
individual desire, it personiﬁes justice on earth better than any other system.” “In
one hundred years,” he predicted, “either autocracy or anarchy will reign in Eu-
rope.”105 Conﬁdent of his ability to replicate the Russian example in France,
Cyon announced his intention to use his newspaper, Le Gaulois, to mobilize a
“republican right” capable of unifying the masses behind a strong, antiliberal
power.106
Juliette Adam’s Russian interlocutors were experts in conversion. Cyon and
Rachkovskii interpreted this act in a literal sense: in order to circumvent the re-
strictions that Russia’s illiberal state placed on Jews, revolutionaries, and other
groups that it imagined to be threats to its power, the former had changed his
faith and the latter his political orientation. Novikova, Radziwill, and Glinka
expressed their own interest in conversion, attempting to explain their devotion
to the autocratic system to the skeptical residents of the foreign nations in which
they had established new lives. Having reconciled seemingly contradictory
views, identities, and experiences in their own life trajectories, Adam’s Russian
interlocutors also discovered creative methods of synthesizing the political cul-
tures of the Third Republic and autocratic Russia. They shared republicans’ in-
terest in popular sovereignty and social justice, and they beneﬁted from France’s
mass media, which allowed them to peddle their ideas to the public. Yet they in-
sisted that France’s liberal system had corrupted its democratic aspirations,102 Ibid., 106–7, 79.
103 O. K., “Voie de Russie,” LNR 4, no. 17 (1882): 939–58.
104 Wolski, La Russie, vi, 253. La Nouvelle Revue helped Rachkovskii advance this
goal, publishing a glowing review of his book: LNR 9, no. 45 (1887): 821–22.
105 Cyon, La Russie, 150–51.
106 Cyon, Histoire, 125, 134.
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Awhich could only be realized by an autocratic strongman committed to progres-
sive reform. This political hybrid deﬁned the basic motifs of the “Franco-Russian
Marseillaise,” producing a common language that both French and Russian pa-
triots could speak.
A Model for France and the World
In the 1880s, Juliette Adam’s French collaborators continued to develop the proj-
ect of political convergence that her Russian interlocutors had deﬁned, discover-
ing their own methods of reconciling the cultures of France and Russia. In 1882
Adam traveled to Russia. Bearing introductions from Cyon, Trubetskaia, Glinka,
and Novikova, she met with Katkov, Pan-Slavic activists, and K. P. Pobedo-
nostsev, the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod and a close conﬁdant of Tsar
Alexander III.107 The salonnière’s trip to Russia was a transformative experience
that helped her envision novel solutions to the challenges that her own nation
faced. Inspired by the Russians’ religious devotion, Adam renounced her long-
held atheism when she returned to France. Coming to see the Catholic Church
as a repository of “authentic” French traditions, she eventually converted to Ca-
tholicism and purchased a neglected abbey on the outskirts of Paris, which she
lovingly restored.108 Adam also became a follower of the Russian occultist Ma-
dame Blavatsky, whose program of theosophy advanced its own program of con-
vergence by enriching Western faith traditions with Eastern mysticism.109
The Russian idea of the charismatic leader intrigued the salonnière as well.
Yet it was not the personalized power of the tsar that most impressed Adam;
rather, it was the heroic bearing of General M. D. Skobelev, a longtime Pan-
Slavic activist and a popular hero of the Russo-Turkish War.110 In a paean to
the general written for a French audience, the salonnière produced her own syn-
thesis of mass political impulses and authoritarian ideas. On the one hand, she
championed the general as a Napoleon for the modern age—a savior for a con-
tinent that appeared to be adrift. On the other, she insisted that the crowds of
“soldiers, bourgeois, women” who followed him and “cheered wildly” at his107 Juliette Adam, Impressions françaises en Russie (Paris, 1912); Morcos, Juliette
Adam, 512–13.
108 Claude Real, “Les quatre-vingts ans de Mme Juliette Adam,” clipping from un-
identiﬁed newspaper, ca. 1916, AN 11 AR 673; Adam, Après l’abandon, 380–81.
109 On Blavatsky, see Gary Lachman, Madame Blavatsky: The Mother of Modern
Spirituality (New York, 2012). On occultist circles in France, John Warne Monroe, Lab-
oratories of Faith: Mesmerism, Spiritism, and Occultism in Modern France (Ithaca, NY,
2008). La Nouvelle Revue ardently promoted the Russian spiritual leader: for example,
Charles Grandmougin, “La Théosophie,” LNR 6, no. 29 (1884): 130–50.
110 Hans Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” Oxford Slavonic Papers 9 (1976):
46–77.
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Aevery utterance were the real source of his power.111 Novikova and Katkov
joined the salonnière’s efforts to build a personality cult around Skobelev, pro-
ducing their own homages to a man whom they hailed as the very embodiment
of Slavic genius.112
Indeed, Adam had invited Skobelev to Paris in 1882, hopeful that the general
could convince her countrymen of the beneﬁts of a Franco-Russian rapproche-
ment and inspire them with his heroic example. At public meetings, Skobelev
delivered an incendiary series of speeches in which he called on Slavs and
Frenchmen to unite in the ﬁght against German domination. “The German is
our enemy,” he proclaimed. “His hand is in everything. We are dupes of his pol-
itics, victims of his intrigues, slaves of his force.” German oppression, he con-
cluded, could only be ended by a racial war that would lead Latin and Slavic con-
federations to victory against the Teutons.113
Outraged by Skobelev’s comments, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which remained a strong supporter of the Dreikaiserbund, ordered the general to
return to Russia and dispatched envoys to Berlin to apologize to Bismarck.114
Skobelev died shortly thereafter, ending Adam’s hopes that the general could
mobilize an international coalition against Germany. The Russian ofﬁcials mon-
itoring the fallout from the Skobelev affair concluded that in spite of the embar-
rassment it had caused to the government, it would have few lasting effects. A
political attaché in Paris reported back to St. Petersburg that the effort to marry
radical Pan-Slavism with French revanchism had few prospects; a movement
led by “a woman and a poet” (i.e., Adam and Déroulède) would never go far.115
By the mid-1880s, however, the French members of Adam’s circle, like their
Russian interlocutors, had begun to converge around an antirepublican consen-
sus. Disavowing her liberal past, the salonnière lamented that France’s republican
democracy had produced an “antinational” impulse no less destructive than a for-
eign invasion.116 Andrieux, for his part, complained that the entire constitutional-
parliamentary experiment had produced only “ﬁnancial disorder, . . . anarchy in
the administration, . . . isolation in foreign affairs, . . . [and] the enervation
[énervement] of all national forces.” “Democracy and parliamentarism,” he ar-
gued, were fundamentally incompatible.117 Rochefort, who had grown increas-
ingly troubled by France’s economic inequality, charged that the republic had111 Juliette Adam, Le général Skobeleff (Paris, 1886), 7, 23.
112 See, for example, O. K., Skobeleff ; Sobranie peredovykh statei Moskovskikh
vedomostei. 1882 god. (Moscow, 1898), 330.
113 Camille Farot, “Le général Skobeleff,” La France, February 18, 1882, 1.
114 “Iz zapisnoi knizhki arkhivista. Rech’ gen. Skobeleva v Parizhe v 1882 g.,”
Krasnyi arkhiv 27 (1928): 222.
115 Ibid., 225–26.
116 “Nos collaborateurs à travers les âges,” Le pilori, December 5, 1886, in APP EA29.
117 Andrieux, “Les élections nationales,” in APP EA23.
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Adegenerated into a dictatorship of high ﬁnance that was incapable of realizing its
democratic aspirations.118
In their agitation against the republic, the French members of Adam’s network
often blamed the nation’s frailty and social inequality on Jews. A short-lived
newspaper launched by the salonnière in 1884 proudly advertised its “antise-
mitic” views, portraying Jews as agents of both capitalist exploitation and revolu-
tionary disorder in both Russia and France.119 Rochefort’s furious denunciations
of the corruption and greed inherent in the capitalist system devolved into
antisemitic attacks against the Jewish ﬁnancial interests that had supposedly de-
stroyed the republic’s ideals.120
Indeed, France’s most outspoken antisemitic activist, Édouard Drumont, en-
tered Adam’s orbit in the mid-1880s. The introduction was probably made by
Alphonse Daudet, who helped the young journalist publish his 1886 antisemitic
screed La France juive.121 Shortly thereafter, Drumont initiated a correspon-
dencewithCyon,whoseworkwould eventuallyﬁgure prominently in the French-
man’s writings.122 (It is clear that Drumont was also familiar with the antisemitic
work produced by Rachkovskii’s Okhrana, which the Frenchman cited in his
own writings.)123 A self-professed Russophile who actively agitated for a Franco-
Russian rapprochement, Drumont, like Novikova andRachkovskii, saw the Rus-
sian Empire as Europe’s one bastion against Jewish inﬂuence. Praising Russia’s
laws that limited where Jews could work, live, and study, he suggested that these
efforts at containment might be replicated throughout the continent.124 The liter-
ary networks associatedwith theAdamcircle enthusiastically promotedDrumont’s
ideas. L’Intransigeant and La Nouvelle Revue both praised the journalist for rais-
ing awareness of the threat that Jews supposedly posed to European civilization.125
By 1886, many in Adam’s inner circle, including Cyon, Rochefort, Mill-
evoye, and Déroulède, had begun to form a cult of personality behind France’s
minister of war, General Georges Boulanger, who shared the central preoccupa-118 “Tous les républicains,” L’Intransigeant, July 23, 1886, 1. On the problem of in-
equality and Rochefort’s concerns: Lehning, To Be a Citizen, 99–106.
119 L’Union Franco-Russe, January 28, 1884, 1. After a brief run in 1884, this pub-
lication was revived in 1890.
120 Roger L. Williams, Henri Rochefort: Prince of the Gutter Press (New York, 1966),
185–86.
121 Grégoire Kauffmann, Édouard Drumont (Paris, 2008), 9–10.
122 Rollin, L’Apocalypse, 449–51. Rollin cites correspondence between Cyon and
Drumont that seems no longer to exist; both men’s personal archives were destroyed af-
ter their deaths.
123 Édouard Drumont, Le testament d’un antisémite (Paris, 1891), 143.
124 Édouard Drumont, La France Juive (Paris, 1886), 1:450–52.
125 “Petite gazette,” L’Instransigeant, July 15, 1886, 3; “Bulletin Bibliographique,”
LNR 9, no. 41 (1886): 456.
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Ations of the salon. A sharp critic of the parliamentary system, Boulanger insisted
that only a strong authority ﬁgure conﬁrmed by a nationwide plebiscite could
restore order to a nation in disarray. Denouncing the suffering and injustice cre-
ated by capitalism, he courted Paris’s working-class citizens with populist rhet-
oric. An ardent revanchist, Boulanger favored a Franco-Russian rapprochement,
which he presented as France’s best insurance policy against German aggres-
sion.126
The general’s rise marked the most notable convergence in French and Rus-
sian politics yet. Boulanger’s backers frequently referenced the cult of Skobelev
that Juliette Adam had created, insisting that the Frenchman shared the heroic
bearing and political charisma of his Russian predecessor.127 (A pamphlet by
an anonymous “Russophile” almost certainly connected to the Adam salon even
christened the general “the French Skobelev.”128) Efforts to “pair” the two he-
roes ultimately transcended Adam’s circle, achieving broader cultural resonance
in France and Russia. A play staged in Kiev in 1887 portrayed Boulanger con-
versing with the apparition of Skobelev—a scene that provoked wild ovations
from the crowd.129 In 1888, at the very height of Boulanger’s popularity, a
full-length equestrian show about the exploits of the Russian general was staged
at Paris’s Hippodrome. This spectacle received a rave review from La Nouvelle
Revue, which inserted excerpts from Adam’s earlier paean to Skobelev into its
description of the show.130
As French and Russian political culture grew more entangled in the 1880s,
Adam’s project of convergence became more ambitious. If Europe’s ﬁrst repub-
lic and its last autocracy could be reconciled, might a new synthesis of antiliberal
ideas and mass politics guide the entire international system toward a better fu-
ture? A beneﬁciary of cross-border travel and exchange, Adam’s circle also en-
couraged transnational transfers by engaging new associates who exported the
ideas that the salon had generated to other settings. One newcomer was the Irish
actress and revolutionary Maud Gonne, who was Millevoye’s lover. (Political
calculation as well as romance drew her to the circle—many Irish nationalists
in exile in Paris gravitated to French revanchists, whose enmity toward England
was second only to their hatred for Germany.)131 In the mid-1880s, Adam also
established contact with W. T. Stead, the British pioneer of “new journalism.”
The son of a nonconformist minister and an advocate of social reform, Stead
had professed strong Russophile views since the 1870s, presenting the tsarist126 Ducray, Déroulède, 162–63, 166–68.
127 Ibid., 154; M. Mermieux, Les coulisses du Boulangisme (Paris, 1890), 284, 287.
128 Russophilos, Le Skobeleff français (Paris, 1887).
129 Torrick, “Courrier des Théâtres,” Le XIXe siècle, May 13, 1887, 4.
130 “Revue du Théâtre,” LNR 10, no. 52 (1888): 958–60.
131 Nancy Cardozo, Maud Gonne (New York, 1990), 50–57.
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Aempire as a bastion of Christian values and as a possible model of an alternate
path to modernity that avoided the shortcomings of the liberal-democratic sys-
tem.132 His writings won the admiration of Novikova, who became one of his
closest friends and ﬁercest proponents. By the 1880s, Stead had become the ed-
itor of the Pall Mall Gazette and Britain’s most outspoken Russophile activist.133
The expansion of Adam’s network brought her circle’s efforts to demystify
tsarist Russia to new audiences. Complementing the salon’s work in France,
Stead endeavored to mobilize British public opinion in favor of the autocracy.
He deemed Alexander III the “peace-keeper of Europe,” described the peasant
commune as the apotheosis of the “republican, democratic spirit” that Britons
so valued, and declared the Pan-Slavs “the only party in Russia . . . to which
an Englishman could belong if he were Russian-born.”134 The diversiﬁcation
of Adam’s circle also created an international media network that ampliﬁed
its ideas through repetition. “London Society” heaped praise on Juliette Adam
and on Stead’s Pall Mall Gazette; Stead’s publications aggressively promoted
Boulanger.135 The Adam circle’s effective use of the media would greatly en-
hance the inﬂuence of the informal networks that it had assembled.
Diplomacy and Publicity
Although Juliette Adam and her associates had created new convergences be-
tween Russian and French politics, several factors thwarted the rapprochement
of which they dreamed. The tsarist government and especially Minister of For-
eign Affairs Nikolai Girs remained ﬁrmly committed to Russia’s alliance with
Germany. Meanwhile, the government of Jules Ferry, which came to power in
France in 1883, showed little interest in revanchist politics, instead working
to enhance French power through colonial expansion.136 In the mid-1880s, how-
ever, two developments enhanced the Adam circle’s inﬂuence in the affairs of
both states. In 1884, Baron Artur von Mohrenheim was appointed Russia’s am-
bassador to France. The new envoy happened to be Katkov’s former schoolmate
and a friend of Jules Hansen, whom he had met during a diplomatic posting in
Copenhagen in the 1860s.137 Two years later, Émile Flourens, an associate of
Adam’s, became France’s minister of foreign affairs.138132 For example, “Our Russian Guest,” Northern Echo, May 15, 1874, 2; “England’s
Immediate Duty,” Northern Echo, September 22, 1876, 2–3.
133 For insight into Stead’s interest in Russia, see Estelle W. Stead, My Father, Per-
sonal and Spiritual Reminiscences (New York, 1913), 56–80.
134 W. T. Stead, Truth about Russia (London, 1888), 120, 97, 175.
135 Ibid., 10–12; Vasili, La Société de Londres, 279, 119.
136 Alfred Rambaud, Jules Ferry (Paris, 1903), 388–403.
137 Hansen, L’Alliance, 18–21.
138 Kennan, Fateful Alliance, 60.
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AEager to take advantage of the unprecedented access that it now enjoyed to the
highest ranks of the Russian and French governments, the Adam circle initiated a
vigorous lobbying campaign that aimed to inﬂuence decision makers in both
countries. Déroulède, Millevoye, and Flourens made multiple trips to Russia in
the late 1880s, where they championed the cause of Franco-Russian friendship be-
fore tsarist ofﬁcials, cultural luminaries, and intellectuals.139 Using the salon-
nière’s network of contacts, Boulanger himself attempted to circumvent ofﬁcial
channels and to establish direct contact with Alexander III.140 Defying the author-
ity of the Russian foreignministry,Mohrenheim denounced the alliance withGer-
many and endorsed a Franco-Russian rapprochement.141 Katkov, too, proved a
valuable ally, besieging the tsar’s advisors with visits and letters and publishing
an open letter to Alexander III that urged him to rethink his foreign policy.142
Meanwhile, the Adam circle worked to forge new bonds between the two so-
cieties. Cyon proved the most successful in this effort. In 1887, he approached
the Russian minister of ﬁnance and offered to use his connections in Paris to ex-
plore the possibility of securing French loans to Russia.143 Shortly thereafter, he
managed to procure a major loan from the Danish-French ﬁnancier Émile Ho-
skier, a close friend of Hansen’s. Next, Cyon approached the Rothschild and
Paribas houses. They too offered enormous loans, which injected 3 billion francs
into the Russian economy.144
An intense public outreach campaign accompanied these behind-the-scenes
efforts to sway the opinion of policy makers and to create new dependencies be-
tween France and Russia. Déroulède’s League of Patriots—which by the mid-
1880s claimed tens of thousands of members, including Cyon—was an ardent
promoter of Franco-Russian friendship.145 The group’s newspaper covered139 Ducray, Déroulède, 166; Toutain, Alexandre III, 102–5. Déroulède spent more
than two months in Russia in the summer of 1886, visiting Moscow, St. Petersburg,
Odessa, and Kiev. “M. Paul Déroulède,” Le Drapeau, September 18, 1886, 448.
140 Albin, La Paix, 108–9; George F. Kennan, “The Mystery of the Ferdinand Doc-
uments,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 26, no. 3 (1978): 342. A French police
agent surveilling Cyon concluded that he served as the main intermediary between the
Boulangists and Russians interested in a rapprochement: Report of August 11, 1889,
APP BA/1023, 40.
141 Jules Hansen, Ambassade à Paris du Baron de Mohrenheim (1884–1898) (Paris,
1907), 20.
142 M. N. Katkov, 2:650–56, 5:642–50; Toutain, Alexandre III, 165.
143 Cyon, Histoire, 237.
144 Kennan, Fateful Alliance, 75–76; Sidney Harcave, ed., The Memoirs of Count
Witte (Armonk, NY, 1990), 127–28. On the importance of French loans to the Russian
economy, see Jennifer Siegel, For Peace and Money: French and British Finance in the
Service of Tsars and Commissars (New York, 2014), 12–49.
145 On Cyon’s membership, see Morcos, Juliette Adam, 505. On the League of Pa-
triots more generally, see Bertrand Joly, Nationalistes et conservateurs en France,
1885–1902 (Paris, 2008), 117–53.
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ADéroulède’s visits to Russia, reported on the warm welcome he had received
there, and preached that Slavs and Latin peoples were natural allies against their
“common enemy,” the Teutons.146 Cyon also promoted a rapprochement before
a French audience, using a press agency run byMillevoye to place his commen-
tary in more than sixty provincial newspapers.147 In Russia, Cyon breathlessly
covered Boulanger’s rise in Katkov’sMoskovskie vedomosti, arguing that Rus-
sia could establish an effective working relationship with a France led by “Gen-
eral Revanche.”148 Complementing Cyon’s campaign, Katkov launched attacks
on Girs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Russian press.149
Eager to bring its project to fruition, Adam’s network turned to a strategy that it
had ﬁrst tested in the “Society” series—fabrication and outright deceit. While on
vacation in Denmark in 1887, Alexander III received a series of documents pur-
porting to show that Bismarck was once again conspiring to undermine Russian
inﬂuence in the Balkans by meddling with the succession to the Bulgarian throne.
These documents ultimately turned out to be a forgery produced by a Belgian fol-
lower of Boulanger at the behest of Adam and Flourens.150 (It is likely that either
Rachkovskii, who acted as Alexander’s bodyguard during his trips abroad, or
Hansen, with his long-standing connections to the tsarina, gave the documents
to the tsar.)151 On his way back to Russia, Alexander passed throughBerlin, where
he angrily confronted Bismarck. The chancellor refuted the claims made in the
documents and produced documentary evidence that cast doubt on their authen-
ticity.152 Desperate to retain their credibility with the tsar, Adam’s associates
turned to forgery yet again, fabricating a new set of documents that purported
to discredit those that Bismarck had produced. Millevoye then sought the aid of
Maud Gonne, whom he correctly suspected could ferry them to Russia without
attracting suspicion. She sewed the documents into her dress and departed for
St. Petersburg. Upon her arrival, Gonne delivered the documents to Radziwill,
who passed them on to Pobedonostsev to share with the tsar.153
Remarking on the Adam circle’s reliance on deceit to accomplish its political
ends, one contemporary argued that it created a “cult of the false document.”154146 Quote from “France et Russie,” Le Drapeau, August 7, 1886, 2. See also Henri
Deloncle, “La presse russe,” Le Drapeau, August 14, 1886, 292; “M. Paul Déroulède,”
Le Drapeau, September 18, 1886, 448.
147 Cyon, Histoire, 222.
148 “Iz Parizha,” Moskovskie vedomosti, May 12, 1886, 4; “Iz Parizha,” Moskovskie
vedomosti, July 10, 1886, 4.
149 Moskovskie vedomosti, July 19, 1886, 3; Dnevnik V. N. Lamsdorfa, 9, 47.
150 The forger was named Adalbert-Henri Foucault de Mondion. For biographical
details, see Morcos, Juliette Adam, 286, 293.
151 Kennan, Fateful Alliance, 167.
152 Hansen, L’Alliance, 71; Cyon, Histoire, 360–61; Kennan, “Mystery.”
153 Colin Smythe, Autobiography of Maud Gonne (Chicago, 1995), 76–82.
154 Rollin, L’Apocalypse, 424.
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AThe network’s interest in forgery (like its broader obsession with illegality and
circumvention of formal bureaucratic processes) was shaped by the culture of
the autocracy—a system in which convincing a single crucial individual of
one’s case could redirect the affairs of an entire state. However, Adam’s asso-
ciates also adapted the technology of forgery for Western settings permeated by
the media. Using the circular press networks that they controlled, they imbued
their fabrications with the trappings of legitimacy through constant repetition.
Although the German press insisted that the allegations levied against Bismarck
were baseless, La Nouvelle Revue, Moskovskie vedomosti, and Stead’s Pall
Mall Gazette reprinted the “Bulgarian documents” in full, amplifying their im-
pact.155 And in 1889, the very Belgian Boulangist who had forged the Bulgarian
documents published an exposé that purported to reveal Bismarck’s continued
machinations in La Nouvelle Revue; this piece presented the chancellor’s vig-
orous denials of the veracity of the documents as proof of his complicity in a
cover-up.156
The Adam circle orchestrated the “Bulgarian documents” affair at a low point
in Russo-German relations. By the late 1880s, rising nationalism and economic
competition had strained the alliance between the two countries; tensions only
multiplied after the 1888 accession of Wilhelm II to the German throne and
the new kaiser’s ouster of Bismarck two years later. In light of these events, Al-
exander III began to express interest in pursuing an alliance with France.157
However, political factors continued to complicate the prospect of a rapproche-
ment. A failed attempt by Boulanger to seize power in 1889 led to the installa-
tion of a moderate republican cabinet in France. The new government moved
decisively to suppress Déroulède’s League of Patriots and to rein in the revanch-
ist agitation that had become so pronounced in recent years. Furthermore, it
charged Boulanger and Rochefort with treason, forcing both to ﬂee to En-
gland.158
With the rapprochement seemingly at risk, it was Rachkovskii who stepped
forward to revive the fortunes of the ﬂagging project. Again, he turned to illegal
methods and deceit. On his orders, one of the Okhrana’s experienced agents
provocateurs inﬁltrated Russian nihilist circles in Paris and opened a bomb-
building operation with his new associates. As the conspirators planned an at-155 Cyon, Histoire, 248, 361; “Iz Berlina,” Moskovskie vedomosti, June 19, 1886, 4;
Stead, M. P. for Russia, 2:348.
156 A compilation of these articles appears as Charles de Maurel, Le Prince de Bis-
marck Démasqué, 1887–1888 (Paris, 1889). Charles de Maurel was one of several pseu-
donyms used by Foucault de Mondion.
157 Nolde, L’Alliance, 536–76.
158 Even after Boulanger’s disgrace, Stead continued to promote him in London: Jo-
seph O. Baylen and Virginia M. Crawford, “An Unpublished Note on General Georges
Boulanger in Britain, June, 1889,” French Historical Studies 4, no. 3 (1966): 347.
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Atack, Rachkovskii informed the French government of the plot. At ﬁrst, the
moderate republican cabinet, which remained suspicious of his intentions, hes-
itated. Under pressure from Mohrenheim and Hansen, however, the minister of
the interior, Jean Constans, ﬁnally moved to arrest the nihilists. (Rachkovskii’s
agent, warned about the impending raid, slipped away.) The remaining defen-
dants were quickly arrested, tried, and sentenced to several years in prison.159
The arrests led to a dramatic improvement in Franco-Russian relations. Un-
aware that the entire affair had been staged by the Okhrana, even the most skep-
tical republican politicians now began to see Russia as a valuable partner in an
international war against terror.160 When informed of the arrests, an overjoyed
Alexander III reportedly exclaimed, “Finally, France has a government!”161 The
case, which received extensive coverage in the French media, turned public
opinion decisively in favor of the tsarist state. In the aftermath of the arrests,
letters from French citizens poured into the Russian embassy, identifying Rus-
sian émigrés whom they considered suspect—an action that several of these
correspondents presented as a fulﬁllment of their patriotic duty.162
Shortly after the Paris nihilist affair, Wilhelm II refused to renew the alliance
with Russia. The abrogation of the agreement offered French patriots the oppor-
tunity to capitalize on the relationships they had cultivated in Russia in recent
years. In 1891, General Boisdeffre entered into negotiations with his Russian
counterparts, which yielded a secret defensive agreement in 1892. More expan-
sive diplomatic negotiations began in 1893, resulting in the formal alliance ﬁnal-
ized in early 1894.163 Although the Adam circle was not directly involved in
these discussions, its members served as intermediaries between the two sides:
Hansen and Rachkovskii delivered memoranda and even a draft of a treaty from
French proponents of the rapprochement to the tsar.164 Adam and her associates
realized their long-standing dream of a Franco-Russian alliance only when high-
ranking government ofﬁcials embraced their interest in a rapprochement. How-
ever, the men who negotiated the Dual Alliance owed a debt to the salonnière’s159 Agafonov, Zagranichnaia okhranka, 37–38; Vladimir Burtsev, “Franko-russkoe
shpionstvo i franko-russkii soiuz,” Byloe 8 (1908): 58–64.
160 Hansen, L’Alliance, 56–57. Hansen, Constans, and the prefect of police all re-
ceived medals and ﬁnancial awards from the Russian government for their role in this
affair: see “Liste des personnes ayant rendu des services dans l’affaire des terroristes
russes à Paris,” HA, ZO, index Vb, reel 67, folder 1. The French government and public
learned that the whole affair had been manufactured by the Okhrana only in 1908. For an
overview of the resulting scandal, see AN F 7 12894, dossier 2.
161 Albin, La Paix, 277.
162 For example, letters of Alexis Trébaux and “Honest French woman,” 1890, HA,
ZO, index XIIIb(1), reel 189, folder 1.
163 Kennan, Fateful Alliance, 82–115, 136–237.
164 Hansen, L’Alliance, 88–91. For the draft treaty, see “Note conﬁdentielle,” Sep-
tember 3, 1891, AD, Archive privée de Jules Hansen, 85PAAP/1, 166.
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Anetwork. Through tireless public diplomacy as well as brazen deceit, Adam’s
circle had forged new ties between the two countries, helping one-time advers-
aries to see each other as allies.
In Pursuit of Universal Convergence
Juliette Adam and her associates played a prominent role in the ofﬁcial celebra-
tions that accompanied the Dual Alliance.165 But even as they participated in
public performances of Franco-Russian friendship, the salonnière and her net-
work expanded their ambitions. Adam celebrated the “mystical” force of the
alliance, insisting that it would usher in a new epoch of mutual understanding
and world peace.166 An updated dispatch from “Paul Vasili” claimed to have
overheard French workers cheering the tsar as their savior, implying that the
Franco-Russian Alliance would beneﬁt French citizens from all walks of life.167
Flourens and his admirers situated the Russian autocracy in the vanguard of a
new political movement that would destroy the superﬁcial differences that di-
vided populations, forming a “collective soul . . . of hundreds and millions of
men.”168 Each of these formulations presented the entente not merely as a turn-
ing point in international affairs but also as the beginning of a new process of
universal convergence capable of uniting all humanity.
The growing ambitions of the Adam circle were evident in its actions as well
as its rhetoric. In 1890, Stead founded the Review of Reviews, a comprehensive
digest of global news. Like other publications connected with Adam, the Review
aggressively promoted the circle’s ownmembers, lavishing praise on Novikova,
Adam, and Cyon.169 But Stead’s goals for this publication were grander than ever
before: he expressed his desire to see it become a “journalistic syndicate that will
also encircle the world” and a “world-wide organization which would be to jour-
nalism what the Catholic Church in its palmy days was to Christendom.”170
Radziwill shared Stead’s global vision, attempting to export the Adam circle’s in-165 Deschamps, Le livre d’or, 119, 279, 395.
166 “Impressions: Consultation sur l’importance de la visite,” Le Matin, October 13,
1896, 1.
167 Paul Vasili, France from behind the Veil (London, 1914), 288, 286.
168 Coelio, “Le livre d’un patriote,” La Libre Parole (hereafter LLP), October 24,
1893, in AN F 7 15956 1. This quote appears in a review of a paean to Alexander III
penned by Flourens, which echoes similar ideas: E. Flourens, Alexandre III: Sa Vie,
Son Oeuvre (Paris, 1894).
169 See “Madame Olga Novikoff,” Review of Reviews 3, no. 13 (1891): 123–36; “The
Foreign Periodicals,” Review of Reviews 3, no. 18 (1891): 666; “A Franco-Russian Al-
liance,” Review of Reviews 1, no. 5 (1890): 405; “Barbarous Russia,” Review of Reviews
2, no. 9 (1890): 245.
170 Unidentiﬁed press clipping, ca. 1890, Emil Dillon papers, Stanford University Li-
brary Special Collections, series 1, box 27, folder 1.
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Aterest in charismatic, authoritarian leadership to a new setting. In 1896, she met
Cecil Rhodes, who struck her as a worthy successor to Skobelev and Boulanger.
Scheming with Stead to unify South Africa into a federation and to install Rhodes
as its head, she launched a newspaper in Cape Town to promote him as an ideal
modern “strongman.”171 Meanwhile, Novikova and Stead, who insisted that Rus-
sia would preside over a new era of world peace, lobbied Russian ofﬁcials to or-
ganize an international conference to limit armaments—and praised the tsarist re-
gime’s role in spearheading the Hague Convention of 1899.172
Adam’s associates also reached out to the Vatican, which they viewed as a
potential partner in their efforts to promote global convergence. Catholic and
Pan-Slavic activists had ﬁrst established contact in the 1870s in an effort to
bring about a new age of universal Christian brotherhood by reconciling the
Catholic and Orthodox faiths.173 The conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alli-
ance and the publication of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum—a vi-
sion of social emancipation under conservative auspices that had much in com-
mon with the program of the Adam salon—renewed the momentum behind this
effort. Cyon, who converted for a second time, this time to the Catholic faith,
insisted that “the Kremlin and the Vatican” could serve as the dual “summits” of
the “civilized world.”174 Radziwill and Rachkovskii, who deemed Leo a “man
of genius,” each met several times with the pontiff in an attempt to reach an
agreement with him.175
The Adam circle’s dreams of realizing a new world order deﬁned by univer-
sal harmony were grandiose, but they were not entirely deluded. Adam and her
associates had both beneﬁted from and contributed to a more open and integrated
world. Eager to break down the boundaries that divided different ideological
systems, national traditions, and religions, they reconciled seemingly opposed
ideas through dynamic processes of conversion and convergence. Through the
effective use of personal networks and the mass media, this circle that brought
women, immigrants, and parvenus in contact with elite politicians and aristo-
crats had helped to steer the evolution of French domestic and international pol-
itics. However, the Adam circle’s efforts to create harmony out of chaos also
produced striking contradictions. Its attempts to reconcile Russians and French-171 Brian Roberts, Cecil Rhodes and the Princess (London, 1969), 241–61, quote
from 261.
172 Stead, The M. P. for Russia, 2:393–412; W. T. Stead, The United States of Europe
on the Eve of the Parliament of Peace (New York, 1899).
173 Eduard Winter, Russland und die Slawischen Völker in der Diplomatie des
Vatikans, 1878–1903 (Berlin, 1950). I am grateful to Mark von Hagen for bringing this
source to my attention.
174 Quote from Cyon, Nihilisme et anarchie, 315. See also Morcos, Juliette Adam,
507 n. 140. France’s Catholic right strongly supported the Franco-Russian Alliance:
Caron, “Catholic Political Mobilization,” 318.
175 Radziwill, My Recollections, 297–302; Rollin, L’apocalypse, 488–90.
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Amen presented Germans and Jews as incorrigible enemies who threatened both
countries. And its efforts to create a universal synthesis relied on distortions,
outright fabrications, and illegal acts.
If Adam and her associates reveled in their ability to inﬂuence policy and to
forge international networks, they also expressed fear that nefarious forces could
do the same. The paranoid vein in the thought of theAdam circlewas evident even
in its ﬁrst activities in the early 1880s. Rochefort blamed assassins for Skobelev’s
untimely death, in spite of the fact that the general was widely known to have died
in a brothel.176 “Berlin Society” charged that Bismarck had consolidated his con-
trol over the globe through pacts that were so secret that even the parties to them
were unaware of their existence.177 Eventually, the Adam circle accused any party
with which it had a disagreement of participating in grand conspiracies. “London
Society” implicated Benjamin Disraeli—a longtime critic of Novikova and her
friend Gladstone—in a plot to undermine Russian interests.178 An anonymous
“diplomat” who contributed to La Nouvelle Revue charged that the moderate re-
publicanswho had opposed a Franco-Russian rapprochement in the 1880s aspired
to foment war and to degrade France.179
As we have seen, the Adam circle was precocious in implicating Jews in plots
to control international ﬁnance and to corrupt both France and Russia. By the
1890s, Jews played a central role in the web of conspiracy theories spun by
the salonnière and her associates. Adam and Rochefort presented Jews as ser-
vants of German interests, charging that they sought to sap France of its national
traditions and to enslave it under an international ﬁnancial syndicate run from
Berlin.180 Novikova claimed that Jews intended to destroy Russia and murder
its people, presenting the catastrophic famine that ravaged the Russian country-
side in 1891–92 as the ﬁrst step in this plot.181 Rachkovskii identiﬁed “Jewish
propaganda intended to harm Russia” as the chief threat facing the autocracy
and composed an exposé that purported to reveal “Judeo-masonic plots” to sub-
ordinate the entire world to Jewish rule.182 EvenCyon, himself of Jewish origins,
propagated antisemitic conspiracy theories. He charged that the Rothschild
house—from which he had obtained one of the earliest French loans to support
Russia—wished to achieve world domination, and he complained that the char-176 “Mort de Skobeleff,” L’Intransigeant, July 11, 1882, 1.
177 Vasili, La Société de Berlin, 250.
178 Vasili, La Société de Londres, 204–5.
179 “La Russie et le Quai d’Orsay,” LNR 13, no. 76 (1892): 251–63.
180 Juliette Adam, My Literary Life (New York, 1904), 122; Henri Rochefort, Les
aventures de ma vie (Paris, 1896), 5:285.
181 Stead, M. P. for Russia, 2:276–95.
182 Undated memo to Director of Department of Police, HA, ZO, index IXb, boxes
206–7, reel 134, folder 1; V. L. Burtsev, “Protokoly Sionskikh Mudretsov” Dokazannyi
Podlog (Paris, 1938), 46.
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Aitable activities of the Alliance Israélite Universelle were nothing more than
shameless efforts by its leaders to become “Jewish royalty.”183
The recycling of these claims within the Adam circle ampliﬁed and radical-
ized them. In 1892, Drumont founded a newspaper of his own, La Libre Parole,
which popularized and embellished the antisemitic allegations frequently heard
in the salonnière’s network. Repeating Novikova’s claims that Jews were to
blame for the Russian famine, the paper added that Jews intended to poison
the grain that relief groups had sent to starving peasants.184 Drumont went on
to organize a relief fund of his own, encouraging his readers to extend assistance
to needy tsarist subjects. Thousands of French citizens who identiﬁed them-
selves with monikers such as “a Judeophobe,” “the avowed enemy of the Jews,”
and “a concierge victimized by Jews” donated small sums that amounted to
more than ten thousand francs.185 The Antisemitic League, an organization in
which Drumont played a leading role and in which Millevoye and Rochefort
participated, also promoted antisemitic ideas before a broader audience. In
1898, the league republished a copy of Rachkovskii’s earlier pamphlet on the
“Jewish question,” subsidizing its cost so that it would be accessible to readers
of the most modest social standing.186
In 1894, the same year that the Franco-Russian Alliance was ﬁnalized, the
French-Jewish ofﬁcer Alfred Dreyfus was arrested and accused of passing mil-
itary secrets to Germany. The detractors of Dreyfus, according to historian Ruth
Harris, were driven by the “lure of the lie, the audacity of deceit,” and promoted
a “climate of fear and conspiracy” that pervaded all of French society.187 Many
of Adam’s associates, who had peddled lies and conspiracy theories for at least
a decade, saw Dreyfus’s arrest as proof of the existence of an international Jew-
ish plot directed against France.188 Agents at the Paris Prefecture of Police,
which continued to maintain warm relations with Rachkovskii’s Okhrana, were
among the ﬁrst to implicate Dreyfus in the crime. The prefecture’s noted crim-
inologist Alphonse Bertillon, who would be honored in 1896 for unknown ser-
vices rendered to the Russian state, compared the handwriting of the accused183 Cyon, La Russie, 322, 317.
184 E. Drumont, “Pour la Russie!,” LLP, July 22, 1892, 1.
185 “Souscription pour les victimes de la famine et du choléra en Russie,” LLP, July 24,
1892, 1.
186 “Bulletin ofﬁciel de la ligue antisémitique de France,” no. 1, January 1, 1898, in
AN F 7 12459.
187 Quotes from Harris, Dreyfus, 243, 177.
188 Indeed, Henri Rollin has argued that the Adam circle’s obsession with conspiracy
theories and forgery helped to provide an intellectual framework in which large seg-
ments of French society could see a loyal ofﬁcer as a treacherous turncoat—and in
which representatives of the French military establishment could fabricate evidence to
implicate Dreyfus in the crime. See Rollin, L’apocalypse, 419–24.
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Awith the script in which the leaked intelligence was written. Acknowledging
the differences between the two samples, he concluded that they were a result
of “auto-forgery”—that is, Dreyfus’s effort to disguise his own hand.189 Dru-
mont, who was among the ﬁrst journalists to draw attention to Dreyfus’s arrest,
spun the affair into a broader narrative of Jewish perﬁdy, claiming that Jews had
also led Boulanger to his downfall and fed rotten meat to French soldiers.190 The
Russian inﬂuence on Drumont’s thinking remained evident even as the journal-
ist marshaled all of his resources to draw attention to “The Treason of the Jew
Dreyfus.” Remarkably, one of La Libre Parole’s ﬁrst reports of the arrest was
preempted by its coverage of the death of Alexander III, whose efforts to protect
peasants from supposed Jewish exploitation the paper praised.191
Adam insisted in LaNouvelle Revue that German denials of a connection with
Dreyfus only proved the existence of a conspiracy, and she denounced her one-
time republican allies who defended the ofﬁcer as embarrassments to France.192
The anti-Dreyfusard fervor of some of Adam’s oldest French associates sur-
passed that of the salonnière. Rochefort, who referred to Dreyfus as an “abom-
inable Jew,” complained that the French state had not been aggressive enough in
prosecuting the ofﬁcer—a “new concession of the French government to Ger-
many,” in his view.193 Déroulède’s League of Patriots, revived by the affair, pub-
licly brawled with the ofﬁcer’s defenders.194
With the beginning of the Dreyfus affair, the distinctive brand of politics that
had coalesced in the Adam salon a decade earlier—a worldview guided by
antiliberal and antisemitic ideology and equally devoted to authoritarian fantasies
and the idea of mass politics—entered the mainstream of French political life. In
1895, Drumont’s La Libre Parole celebrated Adam as a visionary, describing
how her activism had given rise to the “antisemitic world” that had begun to re-
claim “France for the French”: “She hates Cosmopolitanism and the mentality of
foreign upstarts [le rastaquouèrisme], detests the Hebrews across the Channel
and across the Rhine . . . all of these bastards of the Patrie, with souls as foreign
as their physiognomies, these traitors and semi-traitors whose unbelievable com-189 Harris,Dreyfus, 23–24. On Bertillon’s honor, Memorandum to Department of Po-
lice, July 31/August 18, 1907, HA, ZO, index Va, reel 67, box 34.
190 Harris, Dreyfus, 54.
191 See “La Mort du Tsar: La Trahison du Juif Dreyfus,” and “Alexandre III,” LLP,
November 2, 1894, 1.
192 Juliette Adam, “Lettres sur la politique extérieure,” LNR 20, no. 110 (1898): 711;
Juliette Adam, “Lettres sur la politique extérieure,” LNR 20, no. 109 (1897): 525–26.
193 Rochefort, Les aventures, 5:317–18.
194 Harris,Dreyfus, 302–3.AlthoughDéroulède distanced himself from themost radical
antisemitic ideas, by 1899 his League of Patriots was cooperating with the Antisemitic
League. Robert Lynn Fuller, The Origins of the French Nationalist Movement, 1886–
1914 (London, 2012), 112, 130–31.
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Aplacency allows them to betray with ease and without shame.”195 As Drumont
himself must have known, though, Juliette Adam’s vision of a “France for the
French” owed a signiﬁcant debt to the “foreign upstarts” such as Cyon who had
joined her salon.
The Costs of Convergence
Although the Adam circle beneﬁted from its ideological ﬂexibility and its effec-
tive use of the politics of scandal, its activities had a tendency to spin out of con-
trol. The multiple conversions that the salonnière’s associates had experienced
and their fervent attempts to reconcile conﬂicting ideas could induce serious
cases of intellectual vertigo. The network’s members often found themselves
embroiled in practices that they openly denounced; some even became victims
of their own conspiracies.
In the early 1890s, it came to light that Cyon had accepted large kickbacks on
the French loans to Russia that he had negotiated—a revelation that led to his
being dismissed from his position at the Ministry of Finance.196 When Count
Sergei Witte was appointed minister of ﬁnance in 1892, Cyon approached
him and asked to be reinstated. When Witte refused, Cyon declared war, de-
nouncing the minister in La Nouvelle Revue and in pamphlets that he circulated
in France and Russia.197 Cyon charged that Witte had imperiled the empire’s
economic future with crude speculation schemes, chief among them his effort
to place Russia on the gold standard.198 These attacks on Witte frequently in-
voked ideas and images associated with antisemitic conspiracy theories. Cyon
implicated Witte in an international plot to undermine Russia, characterizing
him as “an all-powerful Minister who has the venal press of all Europe at his
disposal and is supported by the high cosmopolitan bank in every capital.”199
He also insinuated that Witte was a servant of Jewish interests and a lackey of
the Rothschilds.200
The minister of ﬁnance—who shared Cyon’s interest in and aptitude for in-
ﬂuencing public opinion—fought back.201 In 1895, Witte convened a special195 “Procès du Juif Weyl,” LLP, August 10, 1895, in APP EA29.
196 Harcave, Memoirs of Count Witte, 129.
197 In addition to the works cited below, see Élie De Cyon, “Choses russes,” LNR 13,
no. 79 (1892): 863–69; Élie de Cyon,Où la dictature deM.Witte conduit la Russie (Paris,
1897).
198 M. Witte et ses projects de faillite devant le Conseil (Paris, 1897), 47–97.
199 Élie de Cyon, M. Witte et les ﬁnances russes après des documents ofﬁciels et
inédits (Paris, 1895), vi.
200 Ibid., 96–100.
201 On Witte’s public relations campaigns, see Anton Fedyashin, “Sergei Witte and
the Press: A Study in Careerism and Statecraft,” Kritika 14, no. 3 (2013): 507–34.
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Acommission of high-ranking tsarist ofﬁcials to study Cyon’s activities abroad.
That commission ultimately demanded that Cyon cease his journalistic activi-
ties and return to Russia. (Cyon had once again taken Russian citizenship in the
late 1880s in order to work for the Ministry of Finance.) When the journalist
refused, the tsarist government pressured France to expel him. Russia’s new ally
complied, forcing Cyon to move to Switzerland.202 Undeterred, he continued to
denounce Witte. The minister now turned to Rachkovskii—with whom he had
established a close and trusting relationship—for help.203 Thus began a ﬁerce
struggle between two of the key promoters of Franco-Russian friendship. Trac-
ing Cyon’s every move in Switzerland, the Okhrana chief sent regular reports
on his activities (and copies of his publications) back to St. Petersburg.204 In
1897, on Witte’s instructions, Okhrana agents burglarized the villa of the jour-
nalist whom Rachkovskii now called “our little Jew.” The agents ransacked the
house and conﬁscated manuscripts that they found there, including a draft ver-
sion of a new anti-Witte polemic.205
Shortly after Cyon’s attacks on Witte began, news broke that a number of
French politicians and journalists had accepted bribes to suppress negative in-
formation about the international conglomerate building the Panama Canal.
Andrieux, Drumont, and Rochefort all played a key role exposing the so-called
Panama affair—and in popularizing the notion that this egregious case of cor-
ruption was the result of Jewish inﬂuence.206 However, it eventually came to
light that Adam, Cyon, and Ambassador Mohrenheim were among those who
had received kickbacks, which they used to fund their agitation in favor of
the Franco-Russian rapprochement.207 These critics of capitalist injustice had
themselves become dependent on international ﬁnance. And in spite of their
claims to promote a more open and united world, they continued to rely on shad-
owy backroom deals.
In the end, it was not always possible to reconcile the curious mixture of
ideas brought together by the cultures of conversion and convergence that the
Adam circle generated. Although Drumont maintained that a strong relationship202 Harcave, Memoirs of Count Witte, 129.
203 Witte described Rachkovskii as “a remarkably intelligent man, in fact the most
gifted and intelligent police ofﬁcial I have ever met.” Ibid., 291.
204 “Doklad,”April 29/May 14, 1895, HA, ZO, index XIIIb(1), folder 1. While Cyon
was still in France, the Prefecture of Police had intervened in an attempt to prevent the
publication of his writings—presumably under pressure from the Okhrana. Report on
Cyon, June 21, 1895, APP BA1023.
205 “Kar’era P. I. Rachkovskogo,” 84–85.
206 The most comprehensive overview of the affair is: Jean-Yves Mollier, Le scan-
dale de Panama (Paris, 1991).
207 Morcos, Juliette Adam, 179; Cyon, Histoire, 437–46. According to Morcos, the
salonnière received almost 60,000 francs in kickbacks. Morcos, Juliette Adam, 480 n. 191.
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Awith Russia was the best means of protecting France from the inﬂuence of
“Jewry [and] the high bank, which are only loyal to Germany,”208 the journalist
and his followers expressed concern that the Dual Alliance had fallen victim to
Jewish exploitation. As early as 1892, La Libre Parole condemned the Roths-
child loans to Russia negotiated by Cyon, charging that they had crowned new
“Jewish kings” whose power now superseded the tsar’s. “We want very much
to loan our money to Russia, but we don’t want to ﬁll the sacs of Jewish usurers,”
wrote one critic.209 Drumont concurred, charging that the Rothschild loans had
enabled “cosmopolitan Jewry” to assume “control of the Alliance for its own
proﬁt, just like it seized the French revolution, the Republic, Panama, and even
Boulangism.” Yet here Drumont became ensnared by contradictions in his own
thought. In order to prove that Russia had been “sold” to the Jews, he quoted ex-
tensively from Cyon’s anti-Witte screeds. Drumont’s call to recover a “pure”
Russia untouched by Jewish inﬂuence was inspired by the work of the very apos-
tate from Judaism whom La Libre Parole accused of mortgaging Russia’s future
to the Rothschilds.210
Divided by internal schisms and compromised by inconsistencies in their
own ideological projects, the architects of the Franco-Russian rapprochement
rapidly lost their political inﬂuence in the late 1890s. Cyon’s acquaintances rid-
iculed the journalist’s penchant for self-reinvention as evidence of his hypoc-
risy and opportunism.211 Rachkovskii’s meddling in French politics, his engage-
ments with the Vatican, and his raid of Cyon’s villa—all of which he had
conducted without the approval of St. Petersburg—earned him rebukes from
his superiors. In 1902, Tsar Nicholas II demanded Rachkovskii’s resignation
and his return to Russia.212 Accused of having furnished the information that
served as the basis of “Paul Vasili’s” report from St. Petersburg, Glinka was also
recalled to Russia and condemned to exile.213 Radziwill too fell afoul of the law.
After Cecil Rhodes—her ideal strongman—rebuffed her romantic advances, she
forged a banknote in his hand, which she intended to use to launch a newspaper
of her own. Arrested and convicted of forgery, she would serve time in a British
prison for her offense.214208 E. Drumont, “Le Panama russe,” LLP, April 26, 1897, 1.
209 Édouard Demachy, “Les rois juifs et les emprunts russes,” LLP, September 3,
1892, 2.
210 “Le Panama russe.” See also Édouard Drumont, Le testament d’un antisémite
(Paris, 1891), 149–58.
211 A. E. Kaufman, “Za kulisami pechati,” Istoricheskii vestnik 133 (1913): 109.
212 Department of Police to Rachkovskii, January 20, 1894, HA, ZO, index Va, reel 67,
box 34, folder 2; “Karera P. I. Rachkovskogo,” 80; Harcave,Memoirs of Count Witte, 515;
Agafonov, Zagranichnaia okhranka, 51–52.
213 Rollin, L’apocalypse, 409.
214 Roberts, Cecil Rhodes, 326, 347.
This content downloaded from 128.135.100.101 on March 20, 2017 13:30:20 PM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
The “Franco-Russian Marseillaise” 75
ABy 1900, Adam, who was nearing the age of seventy, had all but retreated from
politics. However, her inﬂuence lived on among a new generation of young
men who constituted the core of the Action Française, which pledged to defend
national traditions, the Catholic faith, and the welfare of the masses from puta-
tive enemies within and outside of France.215 Léon Daudet (Alphonse’s son),
Maurice Barrès, and Charles Maurras presented Adam’s circle as “the hearth
of the idea of Revanche and the gathering place for a France regenerated”
and thought of themselves as the salonnière’s successors.216 Like the earlier cir-
cle from which they drew inspiration, the men of the Action Française were ar-
dent Russophiles, inspired by the autocracy’s resistance to liberalism, individ-
ualism, and secularism.217
There is another respect in which the cultures of the Adam circle might have
survived its demise. In 1921, a British journalist revealed that The Protocols of
the Elders of Zion—which were published in Russia in 1903 and rapidly prolif-
erated across the globe after the 1917 revolution—was a forgery of an 1864
work entitled Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu by the
French journalist Maurice Joly. Catherine Radziwill, who had by then settled
in New York, resurfaced to claim that Rachkovskii’s press agents had created
the text, and that she had personally seen the ﬁrst version of the forgery in Paris
in the early twentieth century.218 One of Rachkovskii’s French agents, who
served the Paris Okhrana for some three decades, stepped forward to conﬁrm
Radziwill’s story, claiming to have been personally involved in the fabrica-
tion.219 Contemporaries familiar with the Adam circle as well as later researchers
claimed that Iustin’ia Glinka had ferried the forgery from France to Russia.220
The testimony of Radziwill and her associates can hardly be accepted at face
value, and no deﬁnitive proof of the text’s origins has ever emerged.221 Never-
theless, there is strong circumstantial evidence that the Protocols originated in215 For an overview, see Sternhell, La droite.
216 The quote is from Léon Daudet, L’entre-deux-guerres (Paris, 1915), 231; see also
Charles Maurras, L’idée de la décentralisation (Paris, 1898), 18–22.
217 Estienne Hennet de Goutel, “Katkov et le nationalisme russe,” Action Française,
June 15, 1909, 437–45; Georges Valois, D’un siècle à l’autre; chronique d’une génér-
ation (1885–1920) (Paris, 1921), 160–92.
218 The exposé was penned by Philip Graves and appeared in the Times of London.
For a detailed account of the turn of events that led up to this revelation, see Lev Aronov,
Khenrik Baran, and Dmitrii Zubarev, “Kniaginia Ekaterina Radzivill i ‘Protokoly sion-
skikh mudretsov’: Mistiﬁkatsiia kak obraz zhizni,” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 96
(2009): 76–133.
219 Henri Bint to S. G. Svatikov, April 7, 1921, Bakhmeteff Archive, Columbia Uni-
versity, S. G. Svatikov Papers, box 71, folder 1.
220 Aronov et al., “Toward the Prehistory,” 27–28.
221 For a critical evaluation of Radziwill’s claims, see Aronov et al., “Kniaginia
Ekaterina Radzivill.” On the enduring mysteries connected with the Protocols, see Mi-
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Athe very circles reconstructed above. In addition to the work of Joly, the text
borrows from several other sources. One is Cyon’s writings on Witte and the
gold standard, which serve as the basis for the text’s discussions of Jewish ﬁ-
nancial conspiracies.222 The other is an 1868 novel by the German author Her-
mann Gödsche that features a scene in which a rabbi gathers the twelve tribes of
Israel and directs them to achieve world domination.223 The “rabbi’s speech” was
published in three Russian pamphlets in the 1870s, which passed off the ﬁctional
scene as fact.224 In 1881, an author writing under the name “De Wolski,” which
was one of the pseudonyms that Rachkovskii later used in France, republished
this scene in the Catholic journal Le Contemporain.225 The episode appeared
again in La Russie juive, Rachkovskii’s 1887 manifesto on the “Jewish question,”
and it would be frequently referenced and quoted in France’s antisemitic press.226
Textual evidence thus suggests that someone close to the Adam circle was
involved in the fabrication of the Protocols.227 Yet several mysteries continue
to bedevil scholars of the text. One concerns the curious combination of sources
that inspired the forgery. Joly’s work would seem an odd template for history’s
most famous libel against the Jews. A denunciation of the despotic tendencies
of Napoleon III, Dialogue in Hell contains no antisemitic content; indeed, it
promoted an ideological program very different from that espoused by the au-
thor of the Protocols, reﬂecting the longing of the republican opposition of the
1860s for a more open and democratic system. Furthermore, that text, whichchael Hagemeister, “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion: Between History and Fiction,”
New German Critique 35, no. 1 (2008): 83–95.
222 Rollin, L’apocalypse, 450–60.
223 This excerpt is reprinted in full in Herman Bernstein, The History of a Lie: “The
Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion” (New York, 1921), 22–41.
224 Norman Cohn,Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World-Conspiracy
and “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” (London, 1967), 36–39.
225 De Wolski, “Les juifs en orient,” Le Contemporain 22 (1881): 110–52. “De
Wolski” claimed that the ﬁctional account was a description of real events written by
a British diplomat.
226 Wolski, La russie, 3–19. See also Georges Corneilhan, Juifs et opportunistes (Paris,
1889), 40–55;A. Puig, La race des vipères (Paris, 1897), 156; François Bournand, Les juifs
et nos contemporains (Paris, 1898), 283–302. Incidentally, Bournand penned several books
celebrating the Franco-Russian Alliance.
227 CesareDeMichelismakes a strong counterargument. Based on linguistic analysis of
the Russian-language text, which features parlance peculiar to the southwestern border-
lands of the tsarist empire, he concludes that there never was an original French version
of the Protocols; rather, the text was concocted by antisemites in what is today Ukraine
in the ﬁrst years of the twentieth century. Cesare G. De Michelis, The Non-Existent Man-
uscript: A Study of the “Protocols of the Sages of Zion,” trans. Richard Newhouse (Lin-
coln, NE, 2004). It is worth noting, however, that his linguistic analysis may not preclude
the work’s Parisian origins: recall that Rachkovskii and Radziwill both hailed from the
southwestern borderlands, as did many of the Okhrana chief ’s agents.
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Alanded its author in prison and was banned under the Second Empire, had become
an obscure relic by the time the Protocols were created some thirty to forty years
later.228 How did the fabricator of the Protocols “rediscover” Joly’s text? And
what inspired him/her to pair it with the writings of Cyon and Gödsche (medi-
ated by “De Wolski”)?
The second question that has troubled researchers is the precise identity of
the work’s author. Some have accepted Radziwill’s claims that Rachkovskii
and his agents were responsible.229 Others have pointed to Cyon, suggesting
that a draft of the Protocols was one of the documents stolen during the raid
of his Swiss villa.230 Still other accounts, noting that the work’s Russian-language
title could be read as a pun on Cyon’s name (Tsionskie mudretsy/Tsion), suggest
that either Rachkovskii or Drumont might have created and circulated the text
in an effort to discredit or embarrass the journalist.231
Our reconstruction of the circles that were likely involved in the forgery of
the Protocolsmay provide new insights into these enduring questions. It is clear
that multiple members of Adam’s network were acquainted with Joly and his
Dialogue in Hell, the main source of the Protocols. The writer had been a close
associate of Gambetta in the 1870s, and in the ﬁrst years of the Third Republic
he had worked with Drumont at the newspaper La Liberté.232 Connections be-
tween Joly’s world and that of Juliette Adam persisted even after his death.
Joly’s brother, Albert, served as Rochefort’s lawyer.233 The publisher of the Di-
alogue in Hell was a contributor to La Nouvelle Revue.234
The Adam circle can thus be linked directly to each of the texts from which the
Protocols were drawn. Furthermore, the Protocols might be read as an embodi-
ment of the cultures of collaboration, conversion, and convergence that ﬂour-
ished in the salonnière’s circle. Enlisting the democratic yearnings in Joly’s text
in the service of an antisemitic, anticapitalist, and antiliberal crusade, the text mi-
mics the transformation of Adam and her associates, who evolved from champi-
ons of the republican experiment into its harshest critics. Melding sources bor-
rowed from France and Russia into a distinctive synthesis, the Protocols, like228 Carlo Ginzburg, “Representing the Enemy: On the French Prehistory of the Pro-
tocols,” in Threads and Traces: True False Fiction (Berkeley, 2012), 163–64.
229 For example, Burtsev, “Protokoly”; Taguieff, Les Protocoles.
230 A summary of this case can be found in Frank Fox, “The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion and the Shadowy World of Elie de Cyon,” East European Jewish Affairs 27, no. 1
(1997): 3–22. Henri Rollin and Boris Nicolaevsky, who spent much of their lives search-
ing for the author of the Protocols and advanced several theses themselves, agreed by the
1940s that this was the most likely scenario. See the correspondence between the two in
HA, Nicolaevsky Collection, series 248, box 498, folder 9.
231 Kennan, “Curious Monsieur Cyon,” 472–73; Cohn, Warrant, 106–7.
232 Ginzburg, “Representing,” 161.
233 On the careers and the associates of the Joly brothers, see APP BA1129.
234 Rollin, L’Apocalypse, 402.
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Athe “Franco-Russian Marseillaise,” could be seen as a product of the political
entanglements that developed between the two countries in the late nineteenth
century. The text’s conspiratorial mindset and the process of forgery through
which it was created are also consistent with the moral universe and the tactics
of the Adam circle. It is conceivable that the search for the author of the Pro-
tocols has remained fruitless thus far because there never was a single author in
the ﬁrst place. The text, like the “Society” series and the Bulgarian documents,
could well be a collaborative effort compiled over the course of several years by
multiple individuals.
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion encapsulates the ironies of the aggressive
antiliberal politics that emerged from ﬁn de siècle France. On the one hand, the
forgery presented entire segments of the population as existential threats to the
welfare of the nation, promoting violent forms of xenophobia. On the other
hand, the moral universe of the Protocols—and the broader ideological project
that produced the document—were themselves products of transnational ex-
change. The long and fruitful series of collaborations between one-time repub-
licans in France and defenders of the tsarist regime synthesized democratic and
authoritarian impulses and the political cultures of West and East. In the pro-
cess, these exchanges produced a universal antiliberal style capable of bridging
divides between ideological camps and national political traditions. The re-
markable staying power of history’s greatest hoax—which has been promoted
by groups ranging from the White Army to the Nazis, from Hamas to American
white supremacists—is no doubt a legacy of its international heritage and its
global ambitions.This content downloaded from 128.135.100.101 on March 20, 2017 13:30:20 PM
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